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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  Typically when we hear the words China and Tibet in the U.S. there are a lot 
of stereotypical thoughts that come to mind.  In terms of China, we hear about the 
human rights issues, factory workers, a harsh rural urban divide, etc.  When we think 
about Tibet, we may imagine a mystical Buddhist paradise hidden in the Himalayas in 
the likes of James Hilton’s 1933 novel Lost Horizon, or in the more modern sense we 
may imagine a religiously and socially oppressed country.  I admit that when I first 
rather haphazardly and by fluke found myself traveling to this part of the world for 
two months for the first time in 2007, I did not know entirely what to expect.  Nor that 
I would be moved into a five year long journey leading up to the present day that also 
has no end in sight.  I admit that I did have some ideas about entering an ecological 
wonderland so to speak when I learned I would be visiting the Himalayas, which many 
Westerners consider quite mystical, but I had no idea of the cultural journey I was 
about to embark on that would eventually lead to the creation of this thesis. 
  Southwest China’s Yunnan Province could be described as an anthropologist’s 
and an ecologist’s dreamscape.  Roughly the size of Germany, it contains 25 ethnic 
minority groups each with a distinct cultural heritage (Tapp 2010).  Beyond this, the 
area inhabited by these many groups extends from tropical forests in the south 
bordering on Southeast Asia, to high mountain ranges as high as 22,000ft in the north 
in the eastern flank of the Himalayas.  Imagine an area like this and all of the rich 
natural resources that it must possess.  It is one of the most biodiverse temperate 
regions on earth (Biodiversity Hotspots 2007), and presents its people (and the 2 
 
 
Chinese government) with an abundance of opportunities.  One of these is highly 
abundant hydropower resources that can be used to supply eastern China’s burgeoning 
cities (Magee 2006). This hydropower potential is primarily located on three rivers, 
known internationally as the Yangtze, Salween, and the Mekong, and known in this 
part of China as the Jinsha, Nu, and Lancang respectively.  These three rivers each 
tumble down off of the Tibetan Plateau north of Yunnan, and enter into steep parallel 
gorges, all running within less than 50 miles of each other in the northwest part of the 
province (Voices of a Sacred Land). 
  This thesis is the story of one Tibetan village called Meilishi (梅里石, or 
roughly Meilishui in the local Tibetan language) hereafter referred to as Meilishi, on 
the Lancang in Northwest Yunnan.  My hope is to capture the challenges that the 
village facing as it tries to cope with living in a modernizing world under an 
agricultural and forest product based economy.  Additionally, I also wish to paint a 
picture of what the quality of life or standard of living is here today through the eyes 
of Meilishi’s residents, and the challenges that they may be facing in the future as the 
government turns its eye to their section of the river to meet its energy needs. 
  When I first initiated the plans for this project in the summer of 2010, I knew 
that I wanted to in some way study the potential impacts of hydropower on natural 
resource based economics in Southwest China.  I was beginning graduate school as 
part of a grant that was specifically focused on this topic, and it was something that 
had been interesting to me as well since I first entered this part of China three years 
earlier as an undergraduate field student, specifically learning about the damming of 3 
 
 
the Mekong and Salween from a NGO our class met with.  Knowing that doing 
research anywhere that dams already existed was more or less out of the question due 
to issues of political sensitivity, I turned my attention to the upper section of the 
Lancang in Northwest Yunnan.  I knew that at some point the government wanted to 
build dams here that could potentially affect the local people.  I also specifically knew 
some important facts about Meilishi, having visited there and briefly interacted with 
the villagers in the spring of 2009. At that time I learned that this village was engaged 
in the collection of a non-timber forest product
1 hereafter referred to as chong cao, that 
was highly commodified across China, but occurred only in Tibetan areas; providing 
Tibetans with a very strong and important source of income in China’s growing 
market economy (Winkler 2010a, 2010b, and 2008a). 
  Having visited the village during the collecting season for chong cao, and also 
having witnessed various agricultural activities in the village, specifically with respect 
to a growing cash industry of growing grapes and walnuts, I decided that Meilishi 
would be an excellent site to pursue the type of study I was imagining.  Here was a 
village that appeared to have a highly place based market economy, relying on chong 
cao and agriculture to meet its needs, so what would happen if this village got 
relocated at some point in the future to make way for a large reservoir?  This began as 
the underlying question for this project, but after I conducted my field work in 
                                                 
1 The product is known by many names and carries with it a highly complex biology and history.  In 
English it is called caterpillar fungus, in Chinese dong chong xia cao (冬虫夏草, which translates as 
“summer grass winter worm”, though the literal translation of cao is actually insect), or simply chong 
cao (虫草, grass worm “insect”).  In Tibetan it is called yartsa gunbu or simply bu.  In Meilishi, it is 
referred to by its short Chinese name, chong cao.  For more thorough details on the specific biology and 
history of chong cao see Chapter 5. 4 
 
 
Meilishi in September of 2011, I quickly discovered that in addition to trying to find 
out more about how reliant the villagers were on chong cao and other local resources, 
and thus how vulnerable this economy might be to a perturbation like resettlement, 
there was another level of economic vulnerability in the immediate future that existed 
in the village as well.  This had to do with the growing of grapes, something that has 
entirely transformed the agricultural fields of the village over the past eight years into 
somewhat of a mono-crop with respect to cash cropping; a mono-crop that only has 
one market available from which to procure sales, which while good in price, does not 
appear to be stable from year to year.  Having learned this, I adapted my research 
questions to look both at short and long term vulnerabilities in the village. 
 
Research Questions 
  1) What is the state and composition of the resource based economy in the 
  village? 
    Specifically, how do the villagers utilize things like     
    chong cao and grapes to make money, and how reliant are they on  
    these things in order to live a quality life?  If they did not receive  
    income from one of these sources, would they be vulnerable to  
    economic hardship? 
 
  2) How important is the village’s location to being able to pursue and collect 
  things like chong cao and grow the crops that it does?   
    Does the village’s location make its households economically  
    vulnerable to resettlement? 
  
These are the questions that I seek to answer in this work and through the story that I 
uncovered during my time in Meilishi.  Through doing so, and by drawing on my 
literature review and theoretical background in Chapter 3, I also seek to show how my 
study in Meilishi can be used as a case study to look at vulnerability in a broader 5 
 
 
global way, and how my research can contribute to the emerging fields of research and 
theory in vulnerability and resilience in socio-ecological systems.  Before I do this I 
want to first provide an introduction to the Tibetan people that inhabit Northwest 
Yunnan, and the also some basic geography of the region to help paint a picture of the 
space in which Meilishi exists. 
 
The Tibetan People of Diqing Prefecture and Deqin County 
  Meilishi is in the northernmost section of Yunnan Province’s Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, in Deqin County, which is one of three counties within 
Diqing Prefecture.  In China, regions are administered in relatively the same system as 
the United States.  The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, or 
municipalities (like Washington D.C.), which are then divided into prefectures, 
counties, townships, administrative villages, and natural villages.  A natural village is 
the traditional village unit in which all households share kinship ties.  After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, administrative villages were 
added which are now the smallest form of government.  In areas that are dominated by 
ethnic minority groups, known in China as nationalities or shaosu minzu
2 (少数民族), 
autonomous governments are often set up, in which the region will be primarily 
governed by the dominate minority group.  Diqing is Yunnan’s only Tibetan 
prefecture and two of its three counties including Deqin where Meilishi is located, are 
                                                 
2 China includes 56 officially recognized nationalities including the majority Han nationality.  Yunnan 
Province alone contains 25 of these 56 nationality groups. 
 6 
 
 
also Tibetan autonomous counties.  Meilishi is located in Foshan township of Deqin, 
the northernmost tip of all of Yunnan before one either enters The Tibetan 
Autonomous Region or Tibet proper to the north and west, and Sichuan Province to 
the east (see figure 1 below for a map of the region). 
 
Figure 1. Map of Yunnan and its rivers showing Meilishi in the far Northwest. 
(Baseline map courtesy of Bryan Tilt) 7 
 
 
  The Tibetan people that live in Diqing are somewhat unique from those in 
other areas, in that they have had a much longer standing relationship with the Chinese 
and other minority groups through trade and other interactions than those that live in 
the central regions of Tibet.  One of the oldest and biggest trade routes in all of Asia. 
between the Chinese and Tibetans, the ancient Tea-Horse Road, passed directly 
through this area (Freeman and Ahmed 2011).  In many ways, this has helped to make 
the region more harmonious than what one might hear about in the typically western 
news coverage of Tibetan areas in China.  One county south of Deqin is Zhongdian, or 
Gyalthang in Tibetan
3, the prefectural seat which is located on a plateau of about 10-
11,000 ft.  This plateau and the mountains and river valleys surrounding it, including 
the Lancang where Meilishi is located possess very rich forests and agricultural land, 
which as Goodman (2001: 389) suggests may contribute to the Tibetans of Diqing 
being some of the happiest and most fortunate among their ethnicity in China.  Prior to 
1998, when the government unilaterally banned commercial logging, this practice also 
provided a booming industry for many, which has since been largely replaced by 
tourism (though not in Meilishi).   
  Having spent much time here over the past five years, I am somewhat apt to 
agree with Goodman.  The majority
4 of the Tibetans that I have interacted with in 
                                                 
3 Note, Zhongdian City and County were both officially renamed Shangri-La (Xiangelila in Chinese) in 
2001 after the location in the famous novel, Lost Horizon written by James Hilton in 1933.  This was 
part of a government program to promote tourism in the area and it is a known fact that Hilton himself 
never visited Tibet.  However much propaganda has claimed that Zhongdian is indeed the “real” 
Shangri-La, and most Chinese now refer to it by this name.  For more on this see Hillman (2003).     
 
4 There is one exception to this that occurred shortly after my time in Meilishi, but this man came from 
India and made it clear he was not a fan of Shangri-La or its people, insisting that they have more or 8 
 
 
Diqing have been some of the most happy and gregarious people I have ever 
encountered in China, nor have I personally ever witnessed or experienced any 
discontent among these people towards the Chinese.  Intermarriage between the two 
groups (and other minorities) is high, and the local governments are also incredibly 
liberalized with respect to foreign activity in the area, which is quite different from the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region or Tibetan Prefectures in other provinces, such as 
Sichuan and Qinghai.  The welcoming atmosphere and social openness of Diqing’s 
Tibetans has indeed been documented historically from the earlier twentieth century as 
well.  During this time, when many westerners adventured through western China as 
botanical explorers, the famous plant hunter George Forrest came to Zhongdian during 
one of his early trips to China.  Having previously been taken aback by the local 
people he encountered elsewhere in Yunnan, Forrest later remarked how incredibly 
welcoming and friendly the Tibetans of Zhongdian were at that time; making him feel 
more at home than he previously had anywhere else in China (Mueggler 2011a: 56; 
Mueggler 2011b).   
  Today Diqing has more or less become a melting pot so to speak for research 
on Tibetan culture, agriculture, environmental conservation, etc. due to the liberal 
                                                                                                                                             
less been transformed into Chinese.  However since he was not from the area I consider his resentment 
towards the Chinese and the local Tibetans an exception.  Other academics who have been working in 
the region far longer than me who encountered this individual also agreed.  Why this individual is living 
in Shangri-La is complicated and could entail an entire manuscript on the children of Tibetan refugees 
who return to China.  
 9 
 
 
policies that the prefectural government has instituted here
5.  As one expert on Tibetan 
ethnoecology once told me, by choosing to do research on chong cao in Yunnan, I was 
certainly picking the best place for ease of access and also with the best support for 
foreign researchers. 
  Cultural revivalism among Diqing’s Tibetans is a huge movement
6, (Kolås and 
Thowsen 2005) and is to a large extent driven by government sponsored tourism 
development, both targeted towards domestic Chinese tourists and foreigners (Hillman 
2003; Kolås 2008).  As Hillman (ibid) argues, while much of the new Tibetan culture 
that has been created post 2001 with the renaming of Zhongdian or Gyalthang as 
Shangri-La is arbitrarily new, and not in any way authentic to what a traditional 
Zhongdian might have looked like, this does not seem to be an issue for many of the 
local people.  Overall, taking pride in a “newly recognized” Tibetan culture seems to 
be making Zhongdian a better place for the local people through increased tourism 
development.  This is rather different from a similar project in the neighboring Lijiang 
Prefecture, home of the Naxi nationality where tourism has a reached a point of 
commodification like that of Disneyland
7. 
  Things are however different in some parts of Deqin County six hours to the 
north where Meilishi is found.  Some areas of Deqin are indeed heavily reaping in the 
benefits of tourism, specifically those villages located at the foot and center of 
                                                 
5 There are many good examples of research on several different aspects of local life in Diqing, for 
some examples see Glover (2005), Grumbine (2010), Hillman (2003), Kolås (2008), and Kolås and 
Thowsen (2005).  
6 Very similar forms of revivalism have been occurring throughout Southwest China among different 
minority groups.  For examples see McCarthy (2009), (Schmitt (2011) and Wellens (2010). 
7 For more on this see McKhann (2001) 10 
 
 
Yunnan’s highest mountain, Meili Xueshan or Meili Snow Mountain, known in 
Tibetan as Khawa Karpo.  This is one of the most sacred mountains in all of Tibetan 
Buddhism (Da Col 2007; Salick et al. 2007), and Tibetan pilgrims as well as trekkers 
both foreign and Chinese all travel to the region to make kora or circumnavigate the 
mountain, as well as visit other sacred sites and popular villages that cater to tourists.  
One unique aspect to Khawa Karpo as well is that its range is the dividing point 
between the Lancang River valley and the neighboring Nu River valley, so people 
who hike around the mountain get the opportunity to visit both of these great rivers. 
  Meilishi is located about one hour’s drive north of where most of this activity 
occurs, leaving its villagers to practice what has been deemed primarily agro-
pastoralist lifestyles (Wilkes 2006).  Villagers grow crops and herd yaks and dzos
8 for 
their meat and dairy products, and are also heavily engaged in the collection and sale 
of non-timber forest products (Guo 2008).  As I discovered, the most important of 
these resources to villagers was chong cao, but also other mushrooms and herbs, 
including the highly prized matsutake (Japanese) mushroom, which is collected and 
then quickly exported to Japan where it is highly valued (Menzies and Li 2010; 
Winkler 2008b; Yeh 2000).  While Meilishi is actually indeed the ending point for the 
kora around Khawa Karpo, and where the path from the mountain comes down and 
meets the Lancang River, the large majority of people finishing this trek simply hop in 
a car upon arriving and head straight back for the county or prefectural seat.  
                                                 
8 A dzo is a cross between a yak and a cow.  These are far more common in Northwest Yunnan than 
true yaks because they can survive at much lower elevations than yaks but still provide the same 
abundance of dairy, meat, and other resources.  As Meilishi is located at around 5,000ft in elevation in a 
valley bottom, dzos are certainly a better choice. 11 
 
 
  According to one informant in the village who owns a small guest house, this 
has however only been during the last two years.  Before this time only a poor dirt 
road existed, which required people to stay overnight and did indeed provide him with 
some small income from tourism.  Still, Meilishi has never promoted or developed 
itself for tourism either, in the way that the villages further downstream have, probably 
because its location is not conducive to such activity.  It’s more or less off the beaten 
track. 
  But this has not stopped the villagers of Meilishi from living what they deem 
to be fairly good standard of living, as I will demonstrate in later chapters.  By 
combining agriculture and the harvest of forest products, Meilishi’s villagers have 
avoided having to look for work outside their village, and in their own words their 
village is overall better than others in the immediate area.  With respect to crops, as 
previously mentioned, they have filled their fields with grape vineyards, but they also 
intercrop these vineyards with corn, wheat, barley, and a large variety of vegetables all 
of which are used for personal consumption and as animal feed.  Scattered throughout 
the village are walnut trees as well, the nuts of which are harvested and both sold and 
consumed; each family possessing one or two large trees, along with a new orchard 
that has been planted on a slope above the village in which each household will gain 
several more.  Also grown throughout the village are a number a fruit tress used for 
personal consumption including apples, pears, peaches, and Sichuan pepper (hua jiao
花椒).  Quite unlike the higher mountain areas, the bottom of the Lancang River 
valley is incredibly warm all year round, which along with increased access to markets, 12 
 
 
is why the village can benefit from such a rich diversity of agriculture (Moseley and 
Tang 2006; Salick et al. 2005) 
 
Cultural Aspects of Life in Meilishi 
  Culturally, the villagers of Meilishi are more or less the same as other Tibetans, 
although slightly less devout in their traditional customs.  The villagers do consider 
themselves to be Buddhist, of the Yellow Hat or Gelukpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism of 
which the Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader.  However the village does not possess its 
own temple, and according to the father of my host family (hereafter referred to by the 
pseudonym of Adong), they will only travel to worship in a temple across the border 
in Tibet proper on special occasions.  However, each home does contain a small altar 
or shrine for worship and one home I visited did in fact contain a picture of the Dalai 
Lama, which can be somewhat of a rarity in China for political reasons, albeit more 
common in Yunnan.  Most “traditional” culture seems to primarily be held onto only 
by the elderly, the majority of whom carry a necklace of prayer beads known as a 
mala with them and can be observed silently counting the one hundred and eight 
Tibetan prayers, even when engaged in conversation.  Some of the older men might 
also still wear a short of kilt like object over their pants.  The majority of the older 
women all weave colored yarn into their hair or wear it as a bonnet, and also 
accompany this with a colorful apron around the waist (see figure 2 below).  
Additionally, early each morning an elder member or each household will typically 
climb to the roof and burn some cypress or juniper branches as incense and recite 
prayers, a common daily practice throughout the Tibetan region. 13 
 
 
    
 
Figure 2. A village elder with yarn woven in her hair and a colorful apron 
  While Tibetan culture as one might expect to see it does not seem to be 
prevalent in the daily activities of the young or even middle generations in the village, 
it does exist, although in a slightly different form.  One of the major components to the 
tourism development in Yunnan’s Tibetan regions, and the cultural revival as 
described by Hillman (2003), has been a proliferation of new Tibetan pop music and 
music videos that highlight the beauty and wonder of Shangri-La.  This has caught on 14 
 
 
quite noticeably among the youth in Meilishi, who at night can be found watching a 
multitude of music videos highlighting Tibetan life.  One specific example that comes 
to mind from my time in Meilishi was during my drive to leave the village, when we 
gave a ride to a local youth who desired to get to the county seat in Deqin.  During the 
trip our driver played CDs with many Tibetan pop songs and this young man who was 
riding along with us proceeded to sing along for most of the ride, having previously 
memorized all of the lyrics. 
  Having set the stage and placed the lives of Meilishi’s villagers in the context 
of the greater geography of Northwest Yunnan, and given a picture of their daily life, 
this thesis will now proceed as follows.  In Chapter 2 I will provide a literature review 
and background on the Lancang-Mekong River and its Tibetan cultural significance, 
as well as the Chinese government’s hydropower development plans, and how they 
could potentially impact the Lancang River and area surrounding Meilishi.  In Chapter 
3, I outline my theoretical framework of vulnerability research and political ecology, 
and how local knowledge and ethnoecology can be used to both asses socio-economic 
vulnerability and inform more resilient futures.  Chapter 4 briefly summarizes the 
qualitative and quantitative methods used to generate a picture of Meilishi’s household 
economics strategies and to measure economic vulnerability to hydrodevelopment. 
Chapter 5 then provides a background of Meilishi’s or rather Yunnan and Tibet’s rural 
economic strategies, specifically with respect to chong cao, matsutake, other non-
timber forest products, grapes, and walnuts.  Chapter 6 describes the results and 
outlines how Meilishi’s socio-economics demonstrate vulnerability to 15 
 
 
hydrodevelopment.  Chapter 7 explores the additional vulnerabilities I discovered in 
Meilishi due to agricultural commodification.  Chapter 8 summarizes my results in 
describing how Meilishi’s economy has evolved and developed into its present day 
form, provides reflections on future hydrodevelopment, and concludes with 
recommendations to promote future resilience to the vulnerabilities discovered during 
the research. 
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Chapter 2: The Mekong-Lancang and Hydrodevelopment on 
Yunnan’s Rivers 
  The Lancang River plunges from its glacial sources high upon the Tibetan 
Plateau into the deep and dissected gorges of China’s Yunnan Province. It is from 
these gorges flanked by mountains stretching over 20,000 feet in Northwest Yunnan 
that the Lancang River flows into the central canyons and valleys of the province, 
before exiting China to become the Mekong River. From this point the Mekong River 
serves as the lifeblood of many downstream agricultural and industrial communities in 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  As one of the world’s most 
important river basins, the Lancang or Mekong River Basin is home to over 60 million 
people, many of whom directly rely on the river for their daily livelihoods through 
agriculture and fisheries harvests (Magee 2006).  This reliance is in many ways 
reflected in the river’s name, Mekong, which is a shortened version for the Thai name 
of the river, Mae Nam Khong, which translates as “Kong, mother (of) water” (Eustis 
and O’Shea 2006; O’Shea 2006).  Within China, the basin is home to some 
communities that rely on subsistence agriculture, many of which are ethnic minorities. 
 
Tibetan Cultural Importance of the Lancang 
  The Lancang River has many names throughout its long course, north of 
Yunnan, in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province where its source is 
located it is known as the Zaqu in Tibetan (Magee 2011).  In Northwest Yunnan where 
Meilishi is located, the villagers refer to the river (and the neighboring Jinsha and Nu 17 
 
 
Rivers) by yet another set of local Tibetan names as told to me by two village elders.  
When the Lancang is flowing heavily they call it roughly Yaje or Yeja.  The Jinsha is 
called Deche, and the Nu, Remengeche.  As the villagers explained, Ya is a Tibetan 
character or word meaning musk deer, and their name for the Lancang translates 
roughly as “Deer Water.”  This local use of names can in many ways be used to 
suggest that the local Tibetans may indeed attach a great sense of place and 
importance to their natural surroundings, as researched by Lin (2009).  Similarly, 
sense of place as represented by the local natural resources a region provides may be 
seen as a potential indicator of vulnerability to resettlement, as discussed further in 
Chapter 6. 
  Tibetans (not specifically in Meilishi) attach great religious and cultural 
significance to their natural surroundings, including rivers like the Lancang.  As 
documented in an interview with a 90 year old informant during a kayaking expedition 
further upstream: 
  “The river and the mountain are home to powerful spirits.  We have to be 
  careful to upset them.  They are watched over by the spirits, so at least there 
  will be peace.” (Eustis and O’Shea 2006) 
This goes hand in hand with much research including around Meilishi on the 
importance of special sacred sites to Tibetans, and how in many ways, such 
importance has even acted as means for effective conservation of old growth forests 
and other important sites of biodiversity (Choezin 2003; Guo 2008; Salick et al. 2005).  
Additionally, Salick and colleagues (2005) indicated that further ensuring the 18 
 
 
protection of Tibetan sacred sites in the Lancang region could be a highly effective 
strategy for protecting this biological hotspot. 
  While personal observation and that of others (O’Shea 2006) indicates that the 
Tibetans of Yunnan and other regions upstream do not interact with the Lancang River 
on a daily basis in the same agricultural manner as downstream cultures, there is still 
not much doubt that the river and its surroundings carry cultural significance.  As 
documented by the Chinese anthropologist Lun Yin, the Tibetans of Deqin (though I 
could find no informants with similar stories in Meilishi) have a very rich mythology 
associated with the Lancang, and its neighboring rivers the Jinsha, Nu, and Dulong; 
attaching a special significance to the Lancang as a life bearing river: 
  “The Tibetan people describe the nature of their four main rivers in a series of 
  important myths. The Nujiang River is the beautiful mother of all rivers, 
  originating in Tibet and flowing south, and the Dulongjiang, Jinshajiang and 
  Lancangjiang Rivers are her three sons. The Dulongjiang is the bad–tempered 
  eldest son, who brings severe disasters and diseases to local people. The god of 
  Kawagebo (author’s note: this is another name for Khawa Karpo) Mountain 
  punished such bad temper by changing the Dulongjiang’s flow from the south 
  to the west. The Jinshajiang River is the bold and uninhibited second son, 
  bringing fortune and gold to the local people. The huge wave sounds made by 
  this arrogant river enraged the god of Kawagebo, who changed the river flow 
  from south to east. The last son is Lancangjiang,the Mekong River. He is both 
  kind and peaceful, bringing abundant fruits and agricultural products to those 
  who live along his banks. The stories of the rivers tell people what to expect 
  from their natural environment and how they should behave towards these 
  primary sources of life-giving water. The Tibetan people of Deqin have always 
  chosen the plateau and slope lands around the two banks of the peaceful 
  Lancangjiang River for their living and production.” (Yin 2012) 
 
Clearly the Lancang is an important part of daily life among Deqin’s Tibetans, who 
have chosen to make their home here, and as I will show in later chapters, their choice 19 
 
 
has been highly rewarding in the case of Meilishi, due to the rich resources that the 
region provides. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Lancang River flowing beside Meilishi’s agricultural fields. 
 
Hydrodevelopment in Yunnan 
 
  The construction of large dams
9 is a major part of China’s economic 
development strategies, and the Chinese government is continuing to construct these 
                                                 
9 Large dams are defined by the World Commission on Dams (2000) as any dam over 15 meters in 
height or any dam with 3 million cubic meters of storage capacity. 20 
 
 
projects at a rapid pace (Magee 2006).  Hydropower currently supplies China with 16 
percent of its total electricity, and with a burgeoning economy that is highly reliant on 
coal-fired power plants, China’s government sees hydropower as a valuable source of 
clean energy (Rosen and Houser 2007).  Hydropower in China’s western regions such 
as Yunnan specifically, (where the vast amount of the hydropower potential is housed 
on the Lancang, Nu, and Jinsha), is also a large part of two national development 
strategies.  The first is the “Great Western Opening” policy (xibu da kaifa), a strategy 
with several objectives.  The first is to develop western China’s remote, rural, and 
generally poor and marginalized regions through large scale infrastructural 
development, to accelerate development and thereby reduce the sizable gap between 
China’s western and eastern provinces.   
  The second goal of the strategy is to help solve what is known and the 
nationalities problem (Harrell 1995; Rossabi 2004; Tilt 2010: 31-32).  In general, 
China’s minority nationalities including Tibetans, who primarily inhabit the western 
regions, suffer from lower economic prosperity and more marginalization than the 
majority Han Chinese nationality.  The solution of the “Great Western Opening” in 
solving this problem is to promote and fund large scale infrastructure development and 
to harness the vast natural resources of the west, to both alleviate economic disparities 
between the east and the west and bring greater prosperity to minority peoples. 
Despite this, the program utilizes a very top down approach and does not take into the 
account the opinions, knowledge, and economics of the primarily western minority 
communities which it is said to benefit (Tilt 2010: 32).  The second program that 21 
 
 
hydropower is a main player in, is the Send Western Electricity East policy, which is 
an attempt through the harnessing of western China’s rivers to continue to meet the 
large demand for power in eastern China’s great cities (Magee 2006; Tilt et al. 2009).   
  The Lancang River has become a major focus of these policies.  Within the 
lower Lancang Basin in Yunnan, China originally planned a cascade of eight dams, 
which has since been scaled down to seven (Dore et al. 2007; Magee 2011).  Within 
this cascade, four dams are very near completion with the other three expected to be 
completed within the next decade.  Two of these dams, Xiaowan and Nuozhadu, will 
be some of the world’s tallest arch dam structures
10 and create very large reservoirs, 
inundating vast tracts of land and resettling thousands of people (Magee 2006).  Along 
the upper sections of the Lancang where Meilishi is located, the government also has 
plans for another cascade series of dams, ranging anywhere in number from five to 
eleven dams (Magee 2011; UNESCO 2006).  Compared to what Magee (ibid) refers to 
as the “lower cascade” of dams, there is very little information published on the 
“upper cascade,” primarily due to the fact the roads and other infrastructure needed to 
construct such projects have only recently begun to enter the region. 
  Meilishi is located in the upper most section of the “upper cascade,” and 
current culling of sources by Magee (ibid) indicates that a very large dam known as 
Gushui
11 may be built just downstream of Meilishi, and would most certainly inundate 
the village were it to be constructed.  This seems to be confirmed by a series of 
                                                 
10 The well known Three Gorges Dam on China’s Yangtze River is the world’s largest overall dam 
structure.  However Xiaowan and Nuozhadu will actually be even taller. 
11Gushui would become tallest dam in the entire Lancang Basin, even larger than Xiaowan and 
Nuozhadu.  It would also have the third greatest energy generating capacity after these other two.  
  22 
 
 
Chinese archeological studies that have already been conducted further upstream of 
Meilishi in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, to survey cultural sites that the same dam 
at Gushui will inundate (Habibu 2010).  Personal observations show no sign of dam 
construction at Meilishi as of yet, however there are definite signs of construction at 
the next potential dam site identified by Magee (2011), downstream at a village known 
as Liu Tong Jiang.  This dam, both by the look of it and by the information supplied 
by Magee (ibid), looks to be far smaller than the project planned at Gushui, appearing 
as though it may only inundate a few agricultural fields at Liu Tong Jiang village but 
will not force the village to resettle.  However if the government’s current system of 
building relatively small dams downstream of large ones in order to regulate flows 
remains consistent as seen with Xiaowan and Nuozhadu, the project at Liu Tong Jiang 
would appear to be meant to serve the same purpose as a flow regulator for the 
eventual project at Gushui.  See Figure 3 below for a map of the various dams planned 
on the Lancang in Yunnan. 
 
Previous Research on the Impacts of Dams on Yunnan’s Minority 
Communities 
   
  Despite the local growth targets and goals that are touted by the government as 
stemming from the development of dams on Yunnan’s rivers, the vast majority of the 
power that is and will be generated by Yunnan’s large dams is actually transmitted 
thousands of miles east to supply its vast eastern cities, providing little tangible 
benefits to those living in close proximity to the dams (Dore et al. 2007; Magee 2006).   23 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Map of dams on the Lancang.  XW is Xiaowan Dam, NZD is Nuozhadu 
Dam, LTJ is Liu Tong Jiang Dam, and GS is Gushui (Magee 2011).  Personal 
observation indicates that Liu Tong Jiang is indeed going forward and not cancelled as 
Magee originally suggested.  Map courtesy of Darrin Magee. 24 
 
 
What benefits are provided to local communities are usually limited to the provincial 
and lower level governments rather than the actual villages located where the dams are, 
which are very often resettled and fragmented due to the flooding of reservoirs (Tilt et 
al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2008).  These communities, which in the case of the Yunnan’s    
dam locations are most often made up of minority groups, can suffer from many direct 
and indirect negative impacts created by dams, including losses of local ecological 
knowledge and social fragmentation (Chen 2008; Tilt et al. 2009), and also a very 
strong lack of information and awareness provided to them regarding the potential and 
future possibility of resettlement or other impacts that dams may cause (Zhang et al. 
2008).  To this end, even local governments often suffer from a strong lack of 
information provided to them about impending hydropower projects and how they 
may prepare for them (Zhang et al. 2008). 
  With respect to the informational flow about future dam projects and their 
potential impacts, previous survey research in the Nu Basin, which neighbors the 
Lancang, has shown that the further north and away from government and 
infrastructural centers communities are located, the less aware they are about dam 
projects planned in their vicinity.  This lack of information and also consultation about 
dam building in these regions has also been correlated with communities consisting of 
primarily ethnic minority groups, (which include Tibetans), and also a lack of ability 
to speak the country’s standard language, Mandarin Chinese (Foster-Moore 2010; 
Tullos et al. 2012).  This is a key piece of information in this thesis, because Meilishi 
village is located in the northernmost portions of the Lancang, long distances away 25 
 
 
from any government centers, and consists almost
12 completely of minority Tibetan 
peoples.  Thus, as is being suggested in the neighboring Nu River basin, Meilishi 
could have a high a level of vulnerability to dam building and low institutional 
capacity and resilience to adapt to these changes (McNally et al. 2009; Tullos et al. 
2012).  Such research has not however, been directly undertaken in upper Tibetan 
reaches of the Lancang where Meilishi in located, which makes this study unique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 One household did indeed have a member from the Naxi minority who married into the village from 
Lijiang Prefecture to the south. 26 
 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundations. The Importance of 
Ethnoecology and Local Knowledge in Assessing Vulnerability from a 
Political Ecology Perspective   
   In this chapter I highlight my theoretical framework of ethnoecology and local 
knowledge, as well as the concept of vulnerability and how it has been described in 
previous literature.  In originally designing this study and the research questions for it, 
I found myself utilizing the terms traditional ecological knowledge, and resilience 
much more frequently.  However over time and while conducting my research, I came 
to realize that what I was measuring and trying to understand in Meilishi was in fact 
vulnerability much more so than resilience.  As Innes and Booher (2010) and McNally 
et al. (2009) describe, resilience is much more the capacity to deal with and absorb 
vulnerability.  To this end, I have continued to utilize the term in this chapter in laying 
out how research can be conducted that has the potential to enhance the resilience of 
social systems to significant perturbations; the applied goal of this thesis in the 
conclusion, where I make recommendations as to how Meilishi’s economic systems 
can be made more resilient based upon the vulnerabilities that I discovered. 
  With respect to local knowledge and the use of this term over that of traditional 
ecological knowledge, in many ways both the agricultural and other ethnoecological 
practices in Meilishi are fairly recent, grapes being the best example.  Thus, I have 
found it difficult to define or be able to say when knowledge truly becomes 
“traditional,” versus simply being a local form of knowledge about certain aspects of 
life that a population possesses.  Therefore I prefer use of the term local knowledge, 
which in fact has a rich history in anthropology, as has since been applied through the 27 
 
 
eyes of respected anthropologists more broadly to the management of natural 
resources and systems. 
 
Vulnerability in Social-Ecological Systems: Research and Theory 
 
  One of the most thorough and seminal works on vulnerability research and 
assessment methods appeared in 2006, in the Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources.  As the authors Eakin and Luers point out in their thirty page review of 
research and literature, with the advent of the scientific and academic community’s 
interest in global environmental change during the 1990’s, research on multiple types 
of vulnerability also appeared.  However what has also happened is that research on 
vulnerability has more or less diverged into three spheres of study: risk hazard 
assessments, political economy and ecology research, and ecological resilience 
assessments.  However with this divergence full comprehensive analysis is very 
difficult to realize and to locate
13.  In fact, with specific reference to studying the 
vulnerabilities of large hydropower projects, there has been a call for better more 
comprehensive analysis in better understanding how multiple spheres of impact can 
affect a human-environment system (The World Commission on Dams 2000).  Indeed 
since the work of Eakin and Luers (2006), such assessment methods have begun to 
appear (see note 13 below; International Hydropower Association 2010).  In calling 
for comprehensive vulnerability research, Eaken and Luers also indicated that each of 
the different fields approaching vulnerability research characterize it differently, but 
                                                 
13 This thesis is component of the social and economic part of a greater project that is meant to provide 
just such analysis utilizing three pillars of measurement: Socioeconomics, biophysics, and geopolitics. 
See Brown et al. (2009) and Tullos et al. (2012).  28 
 
 
they give a general definition for it as conveying an idea of susceptibility to damage or 
harm (2006).  
  Subsequent to the work of Eakin and Luers (2006), Adger presented 
researchers with a second review article on vulnerability research, which he stated was 
meant to complement the work of Eakin and Luers through a slightly different 
approach and definition of the term.  Here, Adger definitively defines vulnerability as 
“the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with 
environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt.” (2006: 
268). Adger also highlights that vulnerability research has allowed a strong 
convergence of research fields because of its focus on social-ecological systems, and 
the idea that human actions and social ideals are an integral part of how nature 
functions in the current world, which makes distinctions between natural and human 
systems arbitrary.  To this end, Adger divides vulnerability research into two primary 
categories, antecedents and successors, exploring vulnerability before and after 
perturbations on socio-ecological systems occur respectively.  Similarly, the author 
indicates that the concept of vulnerability is incredibly useful for research because it 
can be used to understand susceptibility to harm and powerlessness in both human and 
natural systems.  Vulnerability research is distinguished from resilience research by 
explaining that while resilience is usually considered to be the magnitude of change 
that a system can absorb before it is shifted to a different state, vulnerability is rather 
more typically measured as a susceptibility to be harmed.  Therefore research of these 
two concepts can go hand in hand quite well, with projects used to demonstrate how 29 
 
 
the build up or erosion of resilience in a social-ecological system can then influence 
the level of vulnerability displayed by that system.  Furthermore, good vulnerability 
research is described as that which can highlight vulnerabilities in a socio-ecological 
system, and provide suggestions for better governance and adaptive action that will 
promote resilience.  Resilience in this sense is defined quite well in social-ecological 
systems by Cosens as “the ability of human communities to withstand and recover 
from stresses” (2010: 237).   
  This definition of resilience has in turn been combined by my colleagues in the 
Integrative Dam Assessment project (Tullos et al. 2012; Brown et al., 2009) with that 
used by Adger (2006) of vulnerability to describe vulnerability as: “the characteristic 
of a socio-ecological system that influences its capacity to anticipate, cope with, and 
recover from the impacts of dam construction and related infrastructural development” 
(Tullos et al. 2012).  However for the purposes of this project, I have chosen to utilize 
Adger’s (2006) definition because my desire is to measure vulnerability and utilize 
these measurements as he suggests to inform better resilience; the counter or opposite 
to vulnerability as it is described by McNally et al. (2009).  One reason for this 
decision is that Eakin and Luers (2006) as well as Adger (2006), suggest that both 
vulnerability and resilience are things that can fluctuate over time.  This is important 
to note because in this research I have chosen to measure and capture through 
ethnography, what the vulnerability to hydrodevelopment is at this explicit time for 
one community. 30 
 
 
  Vulnerability research and definitions of vulnerability specifically focused on 
hydropower in China have also been recently established through the Integrative Dam 
Assessment Modeling project (see Tullos et al. 2102 and Brown et al. 2006), which 
this project is a portion of as well.  McNally et al. (2009) define vulnerability as a lack 
in institutional capacity to deal with change, and or a risk of dispute.  Based on this 
definition, the authors suggest these two factors can be measured on varying scales, 
from international, national, and provincial to community levels (2009).  This 
suggestion is extrapolated based upon China’s economic structuring and development 
methods.  On a national scale, China is less vulnerable and stands to benefit 
economically in a very high regard from hydropower.  However, it is also shown that 
on a small scale, there is more susceptibility to socio-ecological systems being 
vulnerable to dams for many reasons.  But particularly due to a lack of public 
participation in and information about such projects, and an already lower economic 
status for rural ethnic minority communities that live in the Lancang and Nu River 
basins (McNally et al. 2009).  However research that looks to specifically address 
these assumptions and observations, and make determinations about vulnerability in 
Yunnan’s Tibetan Lancang communities as this does, has not yet been undertaken. 
 
The Political Ecology/Economy Approach 
 
  This research takes two approaches to measuring vulnerability, one theoretical 
under the category of political ecology, and another under the umbrella of local 
knowledge and livelihood research as a methodological approach (more on this second 31 
 
 
approach in the next section).  As Eakin and Luers describe it, within political ecology 
research, vulnerability is characterized not as an outcome, but rather a state of being 
that is moderated by social and political processes and historical patterns of control 
and marginalization (2006).  This stems from political ecology’s history as a field of 
constructing environmental problems as social and political problems (Forsyth 2003; 
Peet and Watts 1996; Robbins 2004), as a response to what political ecologists call 
apolitical ecology, which lacks social and political components of understanding 
(Robbins 2004). Drawing on neo-Marxist thought, political ecology really began to 
emerge in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, suggesting that in capitalist societies, humans 
become more inextricably linked to nature through production and resource use, but 
that this also then brings up issues of justice in achieving fair distribution and access to 
the natural resources that are utilized (Forsyth 2003; Wolf 1972).  This ideal began to 
emerge further into the 1990’s as a critique of  inequalities in resource access, due to 
poor governance and failed control over both natural resources and various 
underrepresented communities in the neo-liberal era (Escobar 1996; Pete and Watts 
1996; Zimmerer 1996).   
  These ideas developed within political ecology based upon the idea that 
injustices were occurring, especially in the developing world, both against local 
populations and the natural environment, affecting both the resources that these people 
and the global population depended on in one way or another (Forsyth 2003; Pete and 
Watts 1996).  In response to this, new sectors of research emerged that worked to 
better understand how local populations interacted with their natural environments, 32 
 
 
and to better inform policies that would alleviate violations that were being made 
against local people.  As Robbins (2004) describes it, political ecology has been used 
both as a critique or “hatchet” towards socially constructed environmental problems, 
and as a “seed,” to make suggestions and conduct research that can inform better 
governance.    
  As Forsyth (2006) suggests, in response to the call for more holistic 
representation, a critique emerged of earlier anthropological and environmental social 
sciences, such as the practice of cultural ecology by researchers such as Roy 
Rappaport and Julian Steward.  These early approaches assumed that communities 
were bounded entities. By contrast, political ecology researchers considered different 
scales beyond the local. Furthermore, the early approaches of cultural ecology were 
“apolitical,” (Robbins 2004) that is, they considered things like energy, materials 
cycling, etc., but didn’t pay attention to power and politics. By contrast, political 
ecology strives to pay attention to power, politics, access to resources, etc. beyond a 
simple community level. In a sense, this is part of the direction of this project, to 
understand what localized natural resource economics exist in Meilishi, and to 
understand how future centralized development policies will perhaps impact them.  
The idea of cultural ecology within political ecology here being that we need to know 
what it is that is being lost or at least be able to come to understand how the local 
environments and cultures we are concerned about function, and how they might be 
vulnerable to other outside forces.  Thus, tying political ecology into vulnerability 
research as Eakin and Luers (2006) suggest is one sphere of such research.   33 
 
 
  As Forsyth (2006) explains, prior to the development of political ecology, 
vulnerability was considered an ecological and scientific concept, but with the advent 
of this lens, it gained a new definition as exemplified in the following:  
  “A more anthropocentric account of environmental vulnerability, therefore, 
  draws more attention to the social, economic, and political factors that may 
  reduce people’s access to resources to withstand biophysical events or changes, 
  rather than the biophysical changes themselves.”  Indeed, approaches to risk 
  that seek only to reduce the biophysical changes may indeed actually increase 
  social vulnerability.” (Forsyth 2003: 197) 
 
  Similar to drawing upon Marxist thought of economic flux and power as a 
method of political ecology, the ideas on power relations of Foucault have also been 
useful to political ecologists in shaping our understanding of political relationships 
defining environmental problems and resource conflicts (Forsyth 2003; Robbins 2004).  
With respect to Foucault and his theories of power, these are very useful in helping to 
from an understanding of the relationships and dynamics between the Tibetans in this 
study and the dominant Han Chinese society.  Foucault suggests that in western 
society, we consider sovereignty to be the central problem of rights between one 
dominant group and other subordinates (1980: 95).  Basically, the dominant group 
controls whatever rights other groups can posses and what they are allowed to do 
within the society where they exist as subordinates.  While minorities in China and all 
people including Han Chinese for that matter have seen significant increases in their 
livelihoods and wellbeing due to economic development over the last several decades 
(Tilt 2010), they are still controlled by an authoritarian system of governance.  In such 
a system, knowledge becomes power as Foucault describes it, establishing its own 
networks and system by which it moves between different groups of people (1980: 34 
 
 
106-107).  However in China’s system of governance, knowledge and power are not 
allowed to move about freely, keeping sovereignty in check and not allowing what 
Foucault calls the “normalisation of society” (1980: 107).  This can be directly linked 
with some of the previously mentioned vulnerability studies on hydropower 
development in China’s river basins.   
  Studies have found that access to information (knowledge) by local 
communities about dam projects that will directly affect them is scarce in certain 
situations, making them much more vulnerable to the impacts that such projects will 
bring (Foster-Moore 2010; Tullos et al. 2012).  Similarly, local communities who tend 
to the be the most affected by dams in China suffer from the strongest lack of ability to 
participate in decisions regarding their futures, due indeed to the structure and 
relations of power in China (McNall et al. 2009).    
  Within political ecology research in China, power relations, especially between 
governments and local agricultural communities have been shown to create a host of 
social issues, especially since the liberalization of markets in the 1980’s.  The 
examples are numerous, but include describing how the privatization and liberalization 
of agriculture has led to more exploitation of rural natural resources and labor 
(Muldavin 1996), and also studies exploring how centrally planned environmental 
control measures have actually negatively harmed local economic growth (Tilt 2010; 
Tilt 2007).  Such studies have also explored the political components of relationships 
surrounding the collection of non-timber forest products, specifically chong cao and 
matsutake on which this study focuses (Lama 2007; Olsgard Stewart 2009; Yeh 2000).  35 
 
 
  A proliferation of research and literature on China in recent years relating to 
power dynamics and hydropower has appeared as well, and while not always couched 
within a framework of political ecology, all of these works certainly highlight how 
politics are playing a role in environmental planning and between different societal 
sectors and economic groups, including Yunnan’s ethnic minorities (Hessler 2010; 
Grumbine 2010; McDonald 2007; Mertha 2008; Zhang et al. 2008).  Such studies 
highlighting the political ecology of dam building have also extended beyond China as 
well (Öjendal et al. 2012; Johnston 2011; Turner 2011).  Following in the steps of the 
above mentioned works, I see this thesis as both as “hatchet” and a “seed,” 
highlighting ways in which various economic and other policies in China have laid the 
groundwork for Meilishi’s vulnerability.  Yet I also want to plant a seed to show in 
what ways the future of this village (and others around it) can be kept more prosperous 
and viable as functioning rural communities into the future.   
 
Using Local Knowledge to Study Vulnerability and Promote Resilience 
 
  Having formulated a picture of how political ecology has formed a wing within 
vulnerability research and theory, I now conclude this chapter with a section 
describing the use of local knowledge and opinions in understanding vulnerability and 
in promoting conservation.  In utilizing such a framework of local knowledge, it is 
also my goal to be able to make specific recommendations about better decision 
making processes for large scale infrastructural and hydropower development.  An 
approach in natural resources planning that has been suggested can lead to much more 
resilient ecosystems and communities (Innes and Booher 2010: 170). 36 
 
 
Looking first at the term traditional ecological knowledge, it is suggested that 
traditional forms of ecological knowledge are important in understanding how to 
better conserve natural resources and protected areas, and that if development takes 
place before we can fully understand these types of traditional livelihoods, our ability 
to do so may be greatly hindered in the future (Berkes 2008: 39-40).  While in this 
study I have explored many forms of localized ecological knowledge, with respect to 
agro-ecological practices and non-timber forest product collection, I have chosen to 
move away from Berkes’ use of the term traditional due to its temporal implications.  
Still, concepts described by Berkes and others are highly applicable to this study.  To 
this end, having a background in both environmental sciences and anthropology, I 
additionally believe that as outsiders, it is most important to gain a deeper and better 
understanding into how the communities and cultures we are studying relate to their 
surroundings.  This idea ties into the concerns of some political ecologists as described 
by Forsyth (2003), that often in order to understand global environmental problems 
and concerns, we must understand the issues faced by and opinions of local 
communities as well.  In other words, it is key to develop an appreciation for how 
communities learned or created their knowledge base surrounding their local resources 
and how they interact with them.  Much literature is clear that we cannot make 
conclusions or suggestions regarding conservation and decision making without first 
understanding what knowledge local people already possess and how it plays into their 
daily lives (Berkes 2008: 39-42; Drew et al. 2006; Kempton 2001). 37 
 
 
Turing towards to the ethnographic and theoretical works of Geertz, his ideas 
are also important to merits of this study in explaining the value of obtaining the 
opinions and ideas of local communities in China regarding their vital natural 
resources.  As Geertz defines local knowledge, it is “practical, collective, and strongly 
rooted in a particular place,” and says that it is knowledge that is based highly upon 
the immediate experiences of local communities (1983).  With respect to local 
knowledge, Geertz also describes it as law with respect to place, time, and space (1983: 
215).  This is important because for the Tibetan community in this study that relies on 
its own local ecological knowledge for daily livelihoods, such knowledge is key to 
maintaining and governing wellbeing.  However the larger Chinese government would 
not make such a consideration when planning large infrastructural development and 
dams that would displace such communities, making them susceptible to 
socioeconomic vulnerability. 
This idea of local knowledge being useful in better policy making over natural 
resources is further developed by Innes and Booher, who suggest that when local 
knowledge is held by disadvantaged or ethnic minority groups it is more likely to be 
ignored (2010: 172); exactly what often occurs in China between the government and 
ethnic minorities such as Tibetans.  Additionally, the authors further point out that 
technical planners (like those in China) tend to become so tied up in their own fields 
and dilemmas that they ignore local knowledge, often to the point that major 
environmental and human disasters can occur (ibid: 175).  This is exactly the type of 
outcome that has been observed on the human level with large dam building in China, 38 
 
 
even though such projects are said to benefit local communities (Tilt et al. 2009; 
Zhang et al. 2008). 
One of the biggest issues facing communities planned for resettlement in China 
is a lack of allowable public participation in decision making processes
14.  In direct 
response to such practices (though not specifically in China), Innes and Booher 
suggest that local knowledge and opinions must be utilized in decision making for 
natural resources laws and policies that will promote resilient systems (2010: 170-195).  
In the authors’ own words: 
“We make the case for seeking out explicitly and incorporating local and other 
  lay knowledge into planning and public processes because inclusion of such 
  knowledge is critical, not only to social and environmental justice, but also to 
  resilience of our systems…Local knowledge fills gaps, provides information 
  and context, and offers pragmatic, experience-based insights from those who 
  know a situation firsthand… Resilience requires a full range of knowledges, 
  including those that are seldom heard.”  (Innes and Booher 2010: 170-171). 
 
With specific respect to dams and rivers, Cosens (2010) further suggests that it is only 
through the full and open dialogues of the many different stakeholders involved in a 
complex river basin system, and the continuing evolution and incorporation of such 
parties’ views and opinions, that a truly resilient and stable system that can deal with 
future uncertainty can exist.  These theories are, of course, only theories, and will not 
be immediately attainable in making informed observations and suggestions for 
change in an autocratic system such as China’s.  But they are still very useful in that 
                                                 
14 Despite this fact, a new law was established by China’s central government that granted several very 
specific rights to potentially resettled communities, including more active public participation 
opportunities.  It has yet to be determined whether or not this will actually take place (Brown and Xu 
2010; PRC 2006)  39 
 
 
they provide a strong framework for the applied values that this research is rooted 
within. 
  Where this study contributes a new piece to this theoretical framework is that 
literature in vulnerability theory, political ecology, and local knowledge all tell us that 
local communities tend to be vulnerable and underrepresented, but what we often 
don’t know is in what way exactly?  We have learned from the more theoretical side 
of political ecology that localized more nuanced perspectives on natural resource use 
are important, and also from vulnerability theory that in cases like China, local 
communities tend to be the most vulnerable to large development practices because of 
political systems.  But once again we don’t know where this vulnerability is most 
prevalent or how it presents itself within local communities, just that it exists because 
of the fact that they tend to be discounted.  What I have thus sought to do in this study 
is to develop a strong economic and ethnographic methodology for understanding 
local natural resource use and consumption in Meilishi as a case study, knowing that 
hydrodevelopment and resettlement are planned for this region.  In doing so, I define 
vulnerability as Adger does, as “the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to 
stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of 
capacity to adapt” (2006: 268).  Using this definition, I have sought to determine 
specifically how important and valuable local natural resources are to the residents of 
Meilishi, and then extrapolate from these results how the removal of access to them 
would create a “state of susceptibility to harm from social change and lack of adaptive 40 
 
 
capacity” (ibid).  Such a systematic methodological approach has yet to be presented 
or come to full fruition in the literature, which is where this study can then contribute. 
  In closing this discussion on the concept of describing and measuring 
vulnerability, and why local knowledge and populations are important to doing this, 
the anthropologist Lazrus provides one of the most poignant perspectives: 
  “The strong spirits of some people living in threatened environments are also 
  like fortresses, and I am reminded of their steadfast sincerity, dignity, and 
  vision…As much as it is social, political, and physical, vulnerability is also a 
  matter of representation to which questions of agency are central: Who is 
  doing the representing, under what conditions, and for what purposes?” (2009: 
  248) 
 
As I previously described Chapter 1, one of my greatest motivations for completing 
this thesis is because of how the peoples of Yunnan, and its Tibetan communities 
specifically, and the rich environments around them directly interact with each other in 
such a rich way.  The impact this has had on me over the past five years has been 
profound.  Thus, it is out of a passion for these people and their local livelihoods that I 
have chosen to undertake this project, so that in some way the voices of these people 
about the way that they live with their natural surroundings will be brought to the table 
before they may no longer exist in their present from.            
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Chapter 4: Research Methods 
  This chapter provides a summary of the research methods and processes that 
went into this project.  The research occurred in September of 2011, when I spent 
approximately half a month living in Meilishi village along with two research 
assistants in the home of one village family, with whom we interacted on a daily basis 
and who provided us with food and lodging.  As the cornerstone of anthropological 
research, I utilized a primarily ethnographic approach during my time in the village, 
conducting a series of in depth semi-structured interviews, guided by the overarching 
research questions re-stated below:   
  1) What is the state and composition of the resource based economy in the 
  village? 
    Specifically, how do the villagers utilize things like     
    chong cao and grapes to make money, and how reliant are they on  
    these things in order to live a quality life?  If they did not receive  
    income from one of these sources, would they be vulnerable to  
    economic hardship? 
 
  2) How important is the village’s location to being able to pursue and collect 
  things like chong cao and grow the crops that it does?   
    Does the village’s location make its households economically  
    vulnerable to resettlement?   
 
  These questions were developed out of two spheres of preparation.  The first 
being from the literature review and theory on local knowledge and vulnerability, in 
this case creating questions that could help to illuminate more what exactly the local 
knowledge is regarding natural resource use, collection, and economic importance 
within Meilishi.  In this case the literature from political ecology and other fields has 
said that local knowledge of natural resources and their use is important in better 42 
 
 
enhancing the ability to understand where vulnerability (in this case to resettlement) 
exists in local communities and how best to mitigate it and enhance resilience.  
Secondly, I took my prior knowledge from previous visits to the region and other 
background literature (utilized more heavily in chapter 5) to generate questions that 
specifically addressed the natural resources and agricultural products in use by 
villagers to gather local knowledge about natural resources that was specific to 
Meilishi.  Indeed, as I proceeded with my interviews, some of my initial interview 
questions did change and were adapted as I learned more about the specifics of 
agriculture and forest product collection among village households.  
   Additionally, large portions of the information that I collected during my time 
in Meilishi involved the use of participant observation and completely unstructured 
interviews with villagers as I interacted with them in their daily activities.  As Bernard 
(2006: 354) describes, participant observation provides a useful means of triangulating 
ethnographic data and making the results more valid.  As Meilishi is an agricultural 
community, and one directly tied to its local land and resources, my approach to 
participant observation involved participation in several agricultural activities 
including walnut harvests, honey harvests, some yak herding, and wild fruit collecting 
in the mountains above the village.  I also made a regular practice during my time in 
Meilishi of sitting in the middle of the village every afternoon, where people would 
gather each day to talk, play cards, drink beer, and generally socialize.  Since many of 
the villagers were around at this time, some of my best informal conversations in 
which I gained personal insights about the village economy and other aspects of daily 43 
 
 
life occurred during these afternoons.  Despite the fact that the majority of the 
afternoon downtime was an activity pursued by the men of the village, my participant 
observation activities indeed took place with a strong mix of male and female 
participants and informants.  Often times knowing that my research assistants and I 
were around to talk in the afternoons, women would also come to speak with us 
informally, and in fact some of the most enlightening conversations about angst over 
the future of the grape harvest occurred during these conversations.  Participation in 
agricultural activities similarly took place with a variety of villagers from different 
genders and ages, making such interactions more insightful.  Indeed each gender 
pursued agricultural activities from a different perspective and had different 
observations and things to say about such practices and how they played into daily life.     
  Ethnographic research has a rich history of exploring environmental 
interactions as well as perceptions (Rappaport 1971; Scoones 1999; Zanotti et al. 
2010), which made it very conducive to my study as I was specifically looking to 
gather local perceptions of natural resource and agricultural use, and their importance.  
In doing so, my goal was to specifically be able to assess the vulnerability of these 
resource uses to future resettlement.  As Adger (2006) suggests, a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data is well suited to vulnerability research because in 
addition to quantitative assessments, qualitative research and narratives can provide 
rich stakeholder and localized assessments that directly tie into a sense of place and 
put studies in a broader context.  With this in mind, I designed my formal semi-
structured interview with an integrated approach, including several qualitative 44 
 
 
questions relating to natural resources and agricultural practices, as well as questions 
regarding people’s perceptions on their quality of life, economic development, and a 
variety of other factors.  Through qualitative assessment, I was also able to generate a 
good set of oral histories on the collection of forest products and various agricultural 
activities, which helped me to understand how commodities have evolved in 
importance over time and changed in their role within Meilishi’s lifestyles and 
economic activities.  Such oral histories covered topics such as chong cao, mushroom 
collecting, and various agricultural activities and commodities.  This method of oral 
histories about natural resource use through qualitative interview research is one of 
several methods of ethnoecology highlighted by Zanotti et al. (2010).  
  Quantitative questions in the interviews included direct assessments of annual 
income amounts from various natural resources and agricultural products, to directly 
assess the level of importance of these various things within the village’s broader 
economy.  This method has been described as a good measure of vulnerability within 
agricultural communities for political economy research (Jones 2010).  Quantitative 
assessments also involved the use of scaled questions on the importance and 
significance of various commodities, to help illuminate how the loss of access to such 
things from resettlement might make the village economy vulnerable.  For example, 
questions asked whether a product like chong cao was either highly important to 
economic wellbeing, neutral, or unimportant.  If a majority of responses indicated a 
high importance, this was used as a good measure of indication that a loss of access to 
such a resource might indicate vulnerability. 45 
 
 
Data Collection 
  As previously described, my interviews were conducted during an extended 
half month stay in Meilishi in September of 2011.  A longer stay would not have been 
possible without multiple interruptions due to teaching commitments.  However I was 
very fortunate to be able to gain an emic perspective from Meilishi’s villagers very 
quickly due to having previously visited the village in 2009, and already having a 
good relationship with my host family.  I was assisted and accompanied in the village 
by two research assistants, a graduate student in Anthropology from Yunnan 
University, as well as a long time friend and acquaintance from Zhongdian named 
Ashu, who regularly interfaces between foreigners and local people as a guide and 
speaks many local dialects.  This was incredibly valuable as many of the villagers in 
Meilishi, especially the elderly, did not speak Mandarin Chinese (our language of 
interaction), making communication difficult for myself and the other student.  
Already being acquainted with the father of our host family Adong, was also 
incredibly valuable as he was able to be an excellent informant for the study in many 
ways.   
  Indicating that we desired to interview as many of the households in the village 
as possible, Adong provided us with introductions to households each day who we 
then interviewed.  In total, I conducted 20 formal semi-structured household 
interviews.  The member of the household in each case varied based upon availability, 
but a mix of participants was chosen to get a variety of perspectives.  Participants 
included household heads, their spouses, and older children over 18 who played a 46 
 
 
large role in household functioning, as well as elders who could provide rich oral 
histories.  A wide range of ages was also included for respondents by random 
sampling with the oldest being 72, the youngest 18, and many between these two.  Out 
of the 20 interviews, an even mix of male and female respondents of ten each was 
included by random sample and their availability to speak with us.  This provided a 
good mix of opinions from and ideas on the roles of both genders in village household 
life.   
  The number of 20 was chosen based upon availability of introductions from 
Adong of potential household interviewees, as well as content saturation, which was 
adequately reached with 20 (Bernard 2006).  This included a large majority of the 
village, as according to Adong, Meilishi only has 25 households in total.  Interviews 
were conducted in a mix of Mandarin Chinese or local dialect by my research assistant 
Ashu when necessary, and then directly translated into English by Ashu and my 
Chinese graduate assistant and transcribed on paper
15.  Following the interviews, 
transcripts were later transcribed a second time from handwritten form and typed.  In 
addition to these formal interviews, many informal unstructured conversations took 
place with our host father, Adong and other villagers about a variety of topics.  These 
along with a variety of various discoveries during participant observation were all 
recorded as field notes by hand and later typed. 
   
                                                 
15 Audio recording is not common practice in rural China and could have the potential to create political 
worries among villagers about their speaking with a foreign researcher.  Therefore all interviews were 
recorded and transcribed on paper only. 47 
 
 
Background on Adong 
  Utilizing Adong the host father as the sampling informant certainly may have 
formulated the study in some ways based upon his knowledge and position within the 
village, which warrants a short discussion of my relationship with him, his household, 
and their background.  I first met Adong and stayed with his family for the first time in 
2009 as a teaching assistant for an undergraduate field program.  However I had also 
previously met and trekked for two weeks with other immediate members of his 
family as a student in 2007, and formed many close relationships with them.  Adong 
married into Meilishi from a village very close by downstream, and his wife’s brother 
(his brother in law) Norbu works as a travel agent and trip organizer in the prefectural 
capital of Zhongdian/Shangri-La.  Norbu has been involved in arranging lodging, 
guides, transportation and other necessities for academic groups that I have been 
involved with for several years, and in 2009 actually arranged for a group I was 
helping teach to stay in Meilishi and to hike up to the chong cao collecting ground and 
yak pasture where we camped for several days with Adong as our guide.  This was 
when I first came to know him personally, and when I approached Norbu about 
staying in Meilishi, possibly with his family he arranged for us to stay in his family’s 
house with Adong as our primary host.  However we were certainly treated equally 
well as guests by all of Adong’s relatives including his wife, her sister, and their father 
(his father in law). 
  Norbu is the eldest child in the family that Adong married into in Meilishi, and 
he has been highly successful in his travel business as well as establishing many good 48 
 
 
connections outside his village including various levels of social capital with local 
governments.  To this end the entire family is quite well off and in fact one of the 
richer though not the richest family in Meilishi.  Similarly, Adong himself is very 
close with the village leader who is arguably his cousin, though this may just be a 
colloquial term for close friend.  He appears to be very well respected by all of the 
villagers that we interacted with, and despite being better off economically; he never 
hesitated to provide assistance, especially with agricultural work to multiple other 
households.  In addition to his brother in law Norbu’s success, Adong, his wife, sister 
in-law, and father in-law are all highly entrepreneurial and seem to have more 
diversified income than some of the other households in the village.  His father law 
runs and operates one of two small village stores that sells sodas, water, cigarettes, 
toilet paper, and other basic necessities, and the family has also pursued other outlets 
for income such as bee keeping from which they market the honey they harvest. 
  Adong and his family’s position within the village more than likely influenced 
the sampling for the study in that they are very well respected among the majority of 
the village.  However with respect to the few households that we did not sample, 
Adong indicated that some of them were “untouchable” for whatever reason and that it 
was not a good idea to associate with these families.  Whether this is because he did 
not like them is difficult to say, but the impression was certainly given to both me and 
my field assistants that in general these households were somewhat ostracized by the 
rest of the village and this was why we could not interview them.  Certainly another 
area in which Adong’s relationships with other villagers were highly influential to the 49 
 
 
study was indeed his bringing us along with him to participate in the agricultural 
activities of several households who he was choosing to assist.  This was very 
beneficial in that it allowed us to interact with other villagers and discuss various 
things with them in a more informal setting, but it was most certainly facilitated to a 
great extent by Adong’s own relationships.  
 
Data Analysis 
  Qualitative data from the interview transcripts were analyzed utilizing the 
NVivo qualitative software package (Gibbs 2002), using the theme analysis and 
content analysis techniques (Bernard 2006: 463-521; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).  
A variety of recurring themes and thematic relationships were developed with regards 
to perceptions and knowledge over the use and collection of natural resources and 
agricultural practices as well as their importance.  Themes were also developed that 
highlighted how villagers perceived economic development and different aspects 
having to do with what a quality life or life of comfort means.  These being explored 
with specific attention paid to the possession and sale of items like chong cao, other 
forest products, and agricultural commodities.  All of the thematic analyses developed 
were then checked for frequencies as well to see how often specific ideas, references, 
or ideas occurred within the sample of 20 households. 
  Quantitative data were first transcribed from paper interview forms and 
imputed into coded columns in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  This was then 
transferred as a data set into SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences).  50 
 
 
Continuous figures such as income were first analyzed descriptively through 
frequencies and means, to generate an overall picture of the flow of cash in village 
economics and how various commodities plays into this by percentage.  Due to the 
fact that the sample size was small (20), bi-variate statistical anlyses would not have 
been robust enough to further such analyses.  Similarly, scaled questions were also 
analyzed based simply on the frequency of specific answers within the sample to 
illustrate where certainly commodities fell in importance within the perceptions of the 
village as a whole. 
 
Limitations 
 
  Perhaps the greatest limitation was the amount of time available for the study, 
which was limited by a variety of factors including teaching responsibilities and the 
costs of food, lodging, field assistants, and travel to and from Meilishi.  However, the 
limited time was fairly well mitigated by the efficiency with which the formal 
interviews were conducted (in 5-6 days), and Adong’s ability to make this happen.  
During our first full day upon arriving in Meilishi, we conducted interviews with three 
households, and as we became more efficient with our questionnaire and how best to 
interpret the questions to the study subjects, we found we could easily complete four 
formal interviews in one day.  With Adong’s assistance in taking us around the village 
and introducing us to all of the families, we were able to complete the formal 
interviews quickly.  This then left several days time for more informal interactions and 
participant observation activities, which provided some of the richest material for this 
study.           51 
 
 
Chapter 5: Natural Resource Economics and Agriculture in 
Northwest Yunnan and Tibet  
   
  In this chapter I seek to provide an historical and current overview and 
background on the ethno and historical ecologies of Meilishi’s primary economic 
sources, both agricultural and forest product based.  This information can also be 
applied more generally to much of Northwest Yunnan, and Tibet, in terms of the 
economic niche that local rural populations have carved out for themselves in these 
areas.  For the most part, this information is based upon literature reviews, though 
some is indeed based upon my own data collection that sought to determine some of 
the history behind various agricultural and forest product commodification regimes in 
Meilishi.  The goal of this chapter is to provide detailed information on chong cao and 
other resources that are important to villagers in Meilishi.  I have provided additional 
information on subsistence agricultural crops that have been traditionally grown and 
those that still are utilized in Meilishi.   
 
Background on Harvesting and Commodification of Chong Cao or 
Caterpillar Fungus 
 
  As described by Winkler (2005 and 2008a), chong cao has experienced a very 
long history, spanning hundreds of years in both China and Tibet, with its earliest 
known history existing in Tibet, despite its modern day explosion as a consumer item 
in China.  Outside Tibet and China it can also be found in surrounding regions in 
Nepal, India, and Bhutan, in areas also inhabited predominantly by Tibetans (Winkler 
2010b).  Historically it has existed as a traditional form of medicine, both in Tibet and 52 
 
 
China, with uses varying to include use as a tonic, stamina booster, and as an 
aphrodisiac (ibid).  Today when asked whether they actually utilize chong cao 
themselves as opposed to only collecting it as a commodity, 14 out of 20 of the 
households surveyed in Meilishi indicated that they did.  The four uses indicated 
including mixing it in chicken soup, as a medicine (primarily for eye aches), mixing it 
with wine, and sometimes eating it, especially if it is broken when collected.  These 
uses seem to coincide quiet well with a very recent study that surveyed uses among 
several minority groups in Yunnan that also found Deqin’s Tibetans used chong cao as 
a tonic in wine and in chicken soup to improve eyesight (Chen et al. 2010).  Use as a 
tonic also seems to coincide quite well the historical uses of both Tibetans and 
Chinese as described by Winkler (2008a). 
  The biology of chong cao is incredibly strange and complex, and its name 
translated into English of “summer grass winter worm,” is actually quite an accurate 
description.  Chong cao is the body of a caterpillar associated with various species of 
moths that have been parasitized by the fungus known as Ophiocordyceps sinensis, 
formerly Cordyceps sinensis (Boesi 2003; Winkler 2008a and 2010a).  In the autumn 
each year, the caterpillars, which live in the high grasslands over 14,000 feet where 
chong cao is found, effectively eat the fungal spores released by the previous year’s 
chong cao and then go under the ground for the winter to pupate.  However after 
burrowing under the ground, the body of the caterpillar becomes completely 
parasitized and killed by the fungus which it has eaten, leaving behind only the 
exoskeleton.  Later in the late spring and early summer, the fruiting body of the fungus 53 
 
 
emerges out of the ground as it grows out of the former head of the caterpillar.  This is 
the object that the local Tibetans and other collectors can be found looking for each 
year as they crawl across the grasslands.  When collectors find one of these, they often 
then yell out and exclamation of excitement for all around to hear, and proceed to dig 
up the chong cao with a small hand tool very carefully so as not to break it (Winkler 
2008a; personal observations 2009).  In collecting areas each year, including the 
collecting ground above Meilishi, villagers will set up temporary living quarters in 
tents or small cabins in the case of Meilishi, where they remain for several weeks and 
spend each day combing the grasslands for chong cao (Winkler 2005 and 2008a; 
personal observations 2009).  See Figures 4, 5, and 6 below for images of chong cao 
and chong cao collecting. 
 
Figures 5. Chong cao. Figure 6. A villager with a pair of recently collected chong cao.  
According to the villagers in Meilishi, chong cao are always sold and marketed by pair, 
which is the amount for which their prices are determined.  54 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7. The fungal fruiting body of a chong cao seen growing out of the soil. 
   
  In terms of trade and as a source in income, this is where chong cao has found 
its primary place among Chinese and Tibetan society.  It has existed in this manner for 
much time as it has had a recorded use in China since as early as the 1600’s (Winkler 
2008a), and as it only occurs within predominantly Tibetan areas, or other parts of 
Western China, it is something that must be traded for.  Traditionally, this trade seems 
to have been primarily for silk and tea, both items that the Chinese possessed and that 
the Tibetans needed and utilized, the trading for which was often made for with chong 
cao as it was also desired by the Chinese.  This practice was indeed witnessed by 
western explorers who came to western China in the early twentieth century (Boesi 
2003; Winkler 2005). 
  Yet today and over the past ten to fifteen years or so, this trade has exploded to 
levels never before experienced due to the economic boom that China has been 55 
 
 
experiencing and the growth of the middle class and conspicuous consumption.  
Unlike previous decades, when chong cao could be afforded in bulk and used as a 
major ingredient for cooking with dishes such as chicken and duck, chong cao can 
now sell for prices equivalent to its weight in gold (The Economist 2010).  It is 
estimated that its prices increased by 900% over eleven years from 1998 to 2007 
(Winkler 2010b).  Furthermore, under the guise of the aforementioned conspicuous 
consumption that has emerged in China, especially in places like Hong Kong in 
eastern China, but even abroad as well (Hugonoit 2004; Róża Sułek 2009), being able 
to produce chong cao at a dinner table might “rival things like French Champagne” 
(Winkler 2008).  Abroad as Hugonoit (2004) describes, chong cao has even entered 
popular culture, being promoted as a stamina and energy enhancer by former 
professional basketball star Karl Malone.   
  However as some researchers suggest, the status of possessing chong cao may 
not be all that drives the Chinese demand for it.  As something that comes from Tibet, 
both Lama (2007) and Róża Sułek (2009) discuss how possessing chong cao carries 
with it a sense of mysticism as something from a distant wilderness based culture.  
Although as Lama (ibid) also describes through a very detailed ethnography, this has 
also changed the relationships that Tibetans have with their sacred natural spaces.  In a 
sense, chong cao has set the stage for a new form of cultural politics between Chinese 
and Tibetans that has forced Tibetans to invade sacred spaces they would not have 
previously disturbed.  Thus, while as a traditionally marginalized population, chong 
cao has helped to bring Tibetans out of poverty, it has also simultaneously 56 
 
 
marginalized them into the global economy and away from their own cultural space 
(Lama 2007).   Interestingly, this matches one story told by a villager in Meilishi when 
asked about the effects of economic development on chong cao, though she stated she 
did not believe it herself:  
  “I have heard a story from a living Buddha who told the local people here that 
  if you pick lots of chong cao there will be a bad landside in the village and that 
  the people here would become caterpillars in their next life.” 
 
  Clearly, there may be some questioning of the cultural and religious harm of 
what Winkler (2008a) calls the “fungal commodification of Tibet’s rural economy” 
may be causing.  Still, there is absolutely no doubt that over the past few decades 
chong cao has become extremely important to Tibetans across the region as a primary 
source of income, and as Winkler (2005) points out, it is one of the few industries 
from which rural Tibetans can directly collect income themselves, versus other 
industries being developed in the region such as logging, hydropower development, 
and mining.  Additionally, with respect to Yunnan, while the small region in the 
province where chong cao is found produces a relatively small amount compared to 
other regions of China, such as the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, 
this is because the amount land where it is found is small.  Still, Yunnan alone 
produces annual amounts equal to the entire country of Nepal, only slightly less than 
India, and almost double what comes from Bhutan, making Yunnan is quite important 
for chong cao production (Winkler 2010b).  With respect to Yunnan’s Tibetans, as 
later chapters will show, Meilishi is one rural community in Yunnan for which chong 
cao is indeed extremely valuable and important, as its value has continued to increase 57 
 
 
just as it has across the Tibetan Region, making Meilishi’s location and access to areas 
where it can be collected equally important.   
  As the several villagers themselves told me, Meilishi is one of only a few 
villages in its region that has access to a collecting ground for chong cao, which many 
of the villagers also stated they believe makes Meilishi one of the best villages to live 
in in the area.  As my host father Adong also told me during two informal discussions, 
Meilishi in fact has access to two areas where chong cao can be collected each year.  
He also explained that there is another village in the area without chong cao access 
that pays Meilishi100 RMB
16 per person per month each year to share the collecting 
grounds with Meilishi’s villagers.  Interviews with predominantly elderly villagers in 
Meilishi also provided some insight into chong cao’s historical timeline in the village 
as well.  It seems that it has been collected as far back as the 1960’s (at least this is the 
earliest that anyone could remember collecting it), and was sold at very cheap prices at 
that time as well, selling at 12 RMB per jin
17 according to one respondent, or 1 RMB 
for four or five pairs according to two others.   
 
Current Chong Cao Harvesting in Yunnan and Meilishi 
 
  Today, the current marketing of chong cao in Meilishi based upon my own 
household surveys and informal interviews varies from household to household, but 
one consistent fact is that each household sells the chong cao that it collects 
individually and travels to various locations to do so.  The majority of the twenty 
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households surveyed indicated that they simply travel to the county seat in Deqin to 
market what is collected.  However two households indicated that they went further 
away to skip go between levels in the market and make more money by selling 
directly to higher levels marketers.  Of these two families, one indicated that the 
annually travel to Lhasa, the capitol of the Tibetan Autonomous Region where prices 
were said to be higher.  The other household indicated that they had a daughter who 
was going to university in the provincial capital of Kunming, and that they would wait 
to send whatever chong cao they collected with her to sell directly to medicine 
markets in the city.   
  In terms of prices, some households provided a range of prices, indicating that 
the best pairs of chong cao (larger in size) could be sold for as much as 120 RMB, 
while the smallest less desirable pairs could sell for as little as 50 RMB.  Some 
households only provided a single current price however, the average among the 17 
households who could provide prices being 66 RMB per pair.  The average price 5 
years ago between 14 households being 31.5 RMB, 5 years ago from 12 households 
14 RMB, during the 1990’s from six surveys 3 RMB, and during the 1980’s from ten 
surveys producing an average price of 2 RMB.  Clearly, commodification has 
occurred which is certainly consistent with trends across China for chong cao.      
  With respect to distribution and use in Yunnan, chong cao is restricted to the 
northwest region and is only found in isolated pockets of high elevation grassland, 
typically around 14,000 ft.  This is why Yunnan’s total contribution to the overall 
annual production of chong cao is low compared to other regions, because provinces 59 
 
 
such as Qinghai and the Tibetan Autonomous Region simply posses much more 
habitat.  In Deqin County, chong cao is found in two primary areas, on Kawa Kharpo, 
where Meilishi and a few other villages collect it, and also further southeast across the 
Lancang, in areas on the Baima Snow Mountain range (Olsgard Stewart 2009; 
Winkler 2010a).  In both of these areas it is primarily Tibetans who collect and market 
chong cao, while in areas further south on the Lancang and also to the southeast on the 
Jinsha, it also found in small populations where it is collected sold, and used to some 
extent by other minority groups including the Bai, Naxi, and Lisu (Chen et al. 2010; 
personal observations 2009).  Additionally, a new species, Ophiocordyceps 
laojunshanensis that grows at lower elevations in mossy areas has recently been 
discovered in the Laojun Mountains on the Jinsha, a predominantly Lisu, Bai, Yi, and 
Naxi minority area (Chen et al. 2011). 
 
Matsutake, other Mushrooms, and Non-Timber Forest Products 
   
  In addition to chong cao, Meilishi’s households and the majority of the 
villages in the region also engage in the collection of other fungi and non-timber forest 
products as a primary economic strategy.  Regionally (though not in Meilishi where 
my research showed it was a second tier income source), matsutake is by far one of the 
biggest sources of rural household income, contributing 50-80% according to Yang et 
al. (2008), or 25-30% according to Menzies and Li (2010).  In either case, matsutake is 
big business in Northwest Yunnan, and as Winkler (2008b) points out, in the greater 
picture of things, matsutake is overall far more important in Yunnan than chong cao 60 
 
 
because it grows in lower elevation oak forest habitats, of which Yunnan possess a 
large abundance.  Additionally, it has only continued to increase in importance since 
2008 when the government banned commercial logging, which was said to have been 
the most important source of income locally (Menzies and Li 2010; Yang et al. 2008; 
Yeh 2000). 
  Matsutake translates as “pine mushroom” (Yang et al. 2008) in Japanese, and 
personal consumption certainly exists in Yunnan of these mushrooms and most likely 
has for much time among the local people.  However the greatest use of matsutake in 
Yunnan is as an export to Japan, making it one the province’s greatest revenue 
producing agricultural or forest products (Yang et al. 2008).  But this demand as with 
chong cao is a relatively recent phenomenon.  In 1985, less than 20 tons were exported 
to Japan annually, while in 2005, twenty years later, these numbers reached 1,420 tons 
according to Menzies and Li (2010), or 1,300 metric tons generating over 44 million 
U.S. dollars according to Yang et al. (2008).  Diqing Prefecture specifically, where 
Meilishi is located, is said to provide 47 percent of Yunnan’s matsutake, making it by 
far the most important location for mushroom’s collection (Yang et al. 2008).  In 2005, 
when Yunnan produced 1,300 tons of matsutake for export, Diqing produced almost 
half of this, with 611 tons (Winkler 2008b). 
  Despite this recent history of commodification, one of the biggest issues 
surrounding matsutake collection is very unstable prices, due to the fact that Japan can 
get matsutake from several other regions and countries.  In a sense, demand and prices 
are only higher at times when the Japanese are specifically more reliant on Yunnan’s 61 
 
 
matsutake, which can vary from one season to another when the mushroom may or 
may not be ripe in other regions (Menzies and Li 2010; Yang et al. 2008).  Also of 
issue is access to collecting areas, which can be heavily guarded between one village 
and another.  Specially, villages that don’t possess areas where matsutake can be 
found have shown a propensity to attempt to enter regions inhabited by other villages; 
leading to a significant level of conflict (Yeh 2000).  As Yeh explains, this seems to be 
particularly driven by the rising prices of matsutake and a desire by rural people to be 
able to partake in its collection and marketing (2000). 
  With respect to marketing, matsutake moves from Yunnan to Japan very 
rapidly, within 40-50 hours according to Yeh (2000) and in within 48 hours according 
to Yang et al. (2008).  This occurs through a series of intermediaries, and at the village 
level as I was able to observe in Meilishi, what occurs is a buyer will come to the 
village on specific days in the evening to purchase all of that day’s collection.  This is 
done through two processes, first determining the quality of the mushrooms, which 
can include three or four tiers, and then by weight in Chinese jin.  Once this is done, 
the collector is paid.  In the case of Meilishi, as I was informed by Adong as we 
observed an evening matsutake market, the buyer will take the mushrooms to the 
county seat in Deqin and then sell them to another buyer who will take them straight 
to the provincial capital in Kunming.  There they will then be sold again and shipped 
to Japan or sold in local markets.  This seems to correlate with the information 
provided by Yang et al. (2008) as well.  Of course there are some mushrooms which 
are kept by the villagers themselves for personal consumption.  As I observed, these 62 
 
 
are typically of the lowest quality, and additionally a majority of these mushrooms are 
dried by villagers so that they can be preserved for future use. 
  In Meilishi, while some villagers do collect matsutake it is clearly not as 
important as chong cao.  Only 14 out of 20 households indicated that they collected it, 
versus 17 households who said they collected chong cao, and of these 14 households, 
all but one indicated that the money they make from matsutake is significantly less 
than that made from chong cao.  Interestingly however, out of all 20 households 
surveyed, 6 indicated that other mushrooms and forest products were more important 
to them as a source of income than chong cao. This is interesting to note as none of the 
income figures given by these respondents seem to agree with this assertion.  I will 
discuss these specific figures in much more detail in Chapter 6. 
  During my informal talk with Adong during the evening matsutake market, I 
also learned a lot of interesting information specific to Meilishi’s harvest of this 
mushroom as follows.  At this time, the villagers who were collecting were finding 3-5 
jin per day, but could collect as much as 7 jin on a good day.  This year the lowest 
quality mushrooms were selling for 30 RMB per jin, medium quality for 50 RMB, and 
the absolute best for 70 RMB.  However Adong also indicated that they can also sell 
for a little as 10 RMB or as much as 100 RMB per jin.  It looked as if in one day the 
whole village had collected about 70 jin, with the most earned by one person being 
450 RMB that day.  With only 70 jin collected, this was a low day for the village, as 
Adong indicated they can typically bring in between 200 and 300 jin in one day.  One 
fun story worth describing from this experience was just as the marketer was leaving, 63 
 
 
a mute villager showed up who only communicated price by numbers held up by 
fingers. When he gave his day’s take to the marketer who then weighed it, the man 
was then paid 350 RMB, and gave an absolutely huge smile to show his excitement.  
See the evening matsutake market in Meilishi in Figures 8 and 9 below. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Villagers present their matsutake to the marketer to be weighed and priced. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Matsutake are separated by the marketer’s assistants into three different 
qualities.   64 
 
 
   
  Within Meilishi and the surrounding area, villagers also engage in the 
collection of other mushrooms and non-timber forest products, but these are even 
lower tiered as income sources than matsutake.  Only nine out of the twenty 
households surveyed in Meilishi indicated that they even partook in such collection, 
and in all but one case the amounts of income reported from these things were far less 
than those reported for chong cao.  Though in some cases did rival the amounts 
reported for matsutake.   
  Other than matsutake, probably one of the more important things collected for 
income in the region are morel mushrooms, not as lucrative but still a solid 
supplementary source of revenue.  As Winkler (2010c) describes, while traveling in a 
Tibetan section of Northwest Yunnan, he happened to come upon a group of Tibetan 
women on the side of the road who had just spent the day each collecting several 
pounds of morels.  As it turned out, the women had done their collecting while the 
men were simultaneous collecting chong cao higher up in the mountains the same day, 
thus each household was capitalizing on two fungi at the same time.  As Winkler (ibid) 
further describes, in Northwest Yunnan, morels may provide an especially useful 
source of income to Tibetans because of its proximity to the capital of Kunming from 
where most of China’s mushrooms are exported.  It is further suggested that a villager 
might be able to make approximately 130 RMB per each per kilogram of morels 
collected, signifying their importance locally (ibid).  Indeed villagers in Meilishi 
informed me that from time to time they do collect morels to sell, though they could 
provide much less specific information on them than they could on matsutake.  Adong 65 
 
 
was the only informant, who could provide specific figures on morels separate from 
matsutake, indicating that as prices fluctuate they can sell from anywhere between 600 
and 1000 RMB per jin, and that last year he made 2000 RMB from morels. 
  Beyond fungi, nine of the households interviewed in Meilishi indicated that 
they are engaged in the collection and marketing of three other non-timber forest 
products.  These include two herbs known as yeju and beimu, as well as the collection 
of wild peaches, from which the pits can be extracted and sold.  Yeju appears to be a 
word mix of Yunnan dialect and Tibetan language, so it is difficult to determine 
exactly what this product may be in western or scientific terminology.  Beimu on the 
other hand translates from Chinese as the bulb of a fritillary, a member of the lily 
family; the Latin name for this genus being Fritillaria. The collection and sale of 
beimu indeed seems to be a fairly common practice in the region, as it has also been 
documented as being practiced by Nu minority villagers in the neighboring Nu River 
valley (Yin 2001).  I also witnessed Tibetans from surrounding villages collecting it in 
2007.  However, except in the case of Adong’s household (he is part of one of the 
better off families and is very entrepreneurial), the amount of money made from these 
things is never higher than that from chong cao or agriculture, and averages only about 
2,700 RMB per year.  Still, for the families that collect these things, it does provide a 
nice supplemental source, and in Adong’s highest case provides 24,000 RMB per year. 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
 
Cash Agriculture of Walnuts and Grapes 
  The development of the industry behind both grapes and walnuts as sources of 
income in Meilishi and the surrounding area is unique in both cases from a cultural 
standpoint and an economic one, both of which I will now highlight.  Walnuts have a 
rich history in this region of Tibet, where the warm climate of the river valleys is 
conducive to their growth.  Within the region two species are grown among the 
villagers, the native Chinese iron walnut (Juglans sigilatta), and the Persian or English 
walnut (Juglans regia), which it is suggested was introduced into Tibet from Asia 
Minor during the height of the animistic Bön religion prior to Buddhism (Gunn et al. 
2010).  Among the two species, the Persian walnut is used in the more general sense, 
while the Chinese iron walnut which has extremely hard shells is normally cooked for 
several hours and then used to extract walnut oil (ibid). 
  Walnuts are very important both economically and culturally to Tibetans.  
They are priced both as marketable items and for their medicinal and culinary 
properties, which in Southwest China may include use in traditional rituals, and also 
their mixing with the two Tibetan staples, tsampa (barley flour) and butter tea; though 
this does not seem to be practiced in Meilishi (Weckerle et al. 2005).  Walnuts have 
also been an important part of trade in the region for a long time, and may have been a 
commodity that was shared as part of the ancient Tea Horse Trade Route that 
connected Yunnan, Tibet, and also India and Nepal as early as 618 AD.  This route 
passed directly through the Lancang valley on its way to Tibet, so certainly walnuts 
may have played a role (Freeman and Ahmed 2011; Gunn et al. 2010). 67 
 
 
  Walnut tress themselves are also highly important, and are passed down from 
generation to generation with each household in a village possessing its own trees, as 
is the case in Meilishi (Weckerle et al. 2005).  The trees are often planted close to 
homes as shade cover, or also as agricultural barriers and boundary markers in the 
fields.  In some cases they are also used a shade cover next to sacred springs, which 
then makes the tress themselves sacred as well (Gunn et al. 2010; Weckerle et al. 
2005).  In Meilishi, while the tress are not typically scared, they are indeed a major 
part of each family’s possessions, and are also indeed utilized for their shade when one 
wishes to take a break from working in the fields. 
  As Gunn et al. (2005) suggest, walnuts certainly seem to be becoming more 
and more a part of the developing cash economy in Deqin.  In Meilishi, each family 
may possess anywhere from 1 to 3 trees each, and the village has also just recently 
planted a whole new orchard of walnut trees from which each family will get about 30 
new trees or 2-3 mu
18 of walnut land.  The seedlings for this new orchard were 
provided by the government.  Some of the original tress in Meilishi may indeed by my 
estimates be as old as 100 years, see Figure 10 below for an approximately 80 year old 
walnut tree. 
  With respect to the harvesting and use of walnuts in Meilishi, I was fortunate 
to be present in the village during the annual harvest in September (Gunn et al. 2005, 
say it occurs in Deqin in July and August), and was able to take part.  The harvest is 
made with a long bamboo pole with which one climbs the trees and then proceeds to 
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utilize it to knock all of the nuts off of the tress an onto the ground.  From here they 
are collected and then placed into sacks and taken back to the homes where they are 
laid out on the roof tops to dry.  While I did not observe any villagers utilizing nuts 
 
 
Figure 10. An approximately 80 year old walnut tree.  This tree was planted in the 
mountains up above the village and is shared among all the villagers. 
 
culturally for things like butter tea, personal consumption of the nuts is certainly a 
favorite past time, and quite often breaks will be taken from harvesting to simply eat 
some fresh nuts.  To this end, the villagers quite enjoy eating the nuts fresh before they 
have dried, and will crack them open and then peel off the skin before eating them as 
the skin is still quite bitter before it dries out.  After the walnuts have all been dried out, 69 
 
 
the villagers informed me that a buyer will come to the village to which they will all 
sell them.  According to Gunn et al. (2005), this middle man will then typically 
transport the walnuts either to Dali several hours to the south in Yunnan, or to Sichuan 
Province where they will be further marketed.  In Meilishi, 19 out the 20 households 
surveyed indicated that they generate income from walnuts, and these amounts were 
all significantly lower than what is made from grapes.  As Adong told me “it is still 
always the more the better if you can harvest walnuts,” or as another elder in the 
village explained: “For a rich man walnuts would not be important, but for me they 
are.”  On average, among the 19 households who sell walnuts, the annual income was 
1,800 RMB, which could however be expected to go up significantly once the new 
orchard reaches a nut producing stage.  See Figures 11 and 12 below for examples of 
the walnut harvest. 
  With respect to the use and importance of walnuts in the greater Lancang Basin 
in Yunnan, survey research among several communities in the lower basin seems to 
indicate that they are also am important source of income (Galipeau et al. 2012).  
Among 843 households surveyed, at various dam construction sites including the 
previously discussed Xiaowan and Nuozhadu, many households indicated that they 
grew and sold significantly large numbers of walnuts as part of their economic 
strategies.  These results certainly seem to suggest that similar to the Tibetan regions 
around Meilishi, walnuts are indeed a major crop and source of income across much of 
the Lancang Basin in Yunnan, and not only in the northwest (ibid). 
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Figures 11. The researcher carrying a bag of walnuts.  Figure 12. Adong in the tree 
with his bamboo pole. 
 
  With respect to grapes in the region and in Meilishi, this crop is far less of a 
cultural symbol compared to walnuts, and indeed only first appeared in the region 
around 150 years ago by French introduction (Goodman 2001: 183-185; Xingyu 2010).    
In 1852, a French catholic missionary Pére Renou arrived in Deqin and established the 
first church in the Lancang valley.  Though Renou had been able to befriend the local 
Tibetan lamas, this peaceful coexistence did not last, and eventually the original 
churches were destroyed and priests murdered by the local lamas.  However later in 
1909, the Tibetans converts who had remained faithful began construction on a new 
church along the Lancang downstream of Meilishi in Weixi County, at Cizhong 71 
 
 
Village.  This community still exists today, and as has remained faithful to its Catholic 
beliefs (Goodman 2001: 183-185).  At Cizhong, the priests introduced grape 
cultivation to the Tibetan villagers, and here they still not only grow grapes today but 
produce wine themselves as well, which they cellar in Cizhong’s church.  Cizhong and 
the upper Lancang where many villages now grow grapes is said to be the world’s 
highest area in elevation where grapes are cultivated, but the warm year round climate 
found in the valley bottom has proved very conducive to their production.  Quite 
interestingly as well, when a French wine expert visited the region in 1997, it was 
discovered that the grape variety being produced in Deqin was in fact a lost variety 
that had been previously killed off in France by an infestation (Xingyu 2010). 
  Grape growing appears to have begun much more recently in Meilishi.  In 
1997 the provincial brand of wine, Yunnan Red Wine arrived in markets from grapes 
that were primarily being produced in areas downstream on the Lancang (Xingyu 
2010).  However, later sometime after 2001 and the development and transformation 
of Zhongdian into Shangri-La, a second more local wine company was founded called 
the Shangri-La Red Wine company, which used the mystique and tourism surrounding 
the region to promote itself.  There is extremely little information available on this 
industry, but what appears to have happened is that approximately eight to ten years 
ago, most likely the prefectural government in conjunction with the new wine 
company began to approach villages in the Lancang Valley as well as the neighboring 
Jinsha about growing grapes.  According to the villagers in Meilishi, the government 
first arrived 8 years ago, and one villager who is the community leader accepted their 72 
 
 
offer to begin growing grapes in his fields and to sell them to the Shangri-La Red 
Wine company.  He was told that the company would pay him very good money in 
exchange for the grapes.  For doing this the government provided the villagers with 
both the grape seedlings and concrete supports and wire to grow the vines on.  
   Following this initial introduction, over the past eight years, more and more of 
the village caught on to the practice, after observing how much money people were 
making annually by growing and selling grapes.  Slowly, Meilishi’s agricultural fields 
became completely transformed into vineyards, and two years ago the last family 
joined in the practice and now the entire village grows grapes.  One family I 
interviewed has not transformed all of its fields as they raise a large number of yaks, 
and still require space to grow feed.  In general, the villagers do not eat the grapes 
themselves, but they have intercropped a small number of table grape vines in with the 
wine grapes, which they do indeed eat, mostly as snacks, which can be nice when 
working in the fields.  
  In total, all twenty households in Meilishi that were surveyed indicated that 
they grow grapes, making an average annual income of 13,195 RMB, very close to the 
average income from chong cao for the village which is 10,775 RMB.  Additionally, 
when asked what their most important source of income was, 12 of twenty households 
indicated grapes and chong cao combined, 3 indicated grapes, chong cao and other 
non-timber forest products, and 2 indicated purely grapes.  Clearly over eight years, 
grapes have reached a very high level of importance and the villagers have come to 73 
 
 
greatly rely on them.  Something I will show in Chapter 7 has generated a huge feeling 
of angst and concern among many of the village households. 
 
 
Figure 13. Meilishi’s vineyards.  Note the intercropping of corn primarily as animal 
feed. 
 
 
Subsistence Crops and Changes in Diet 
  As grapes have become one of the only and primary crops grown in abundance 
in Meilishi, I also wish to overview what crops villagers have historically grown 
primarily for subsistence (and as a cash crop) and others that are still grown today in 
small abundance for such purposes.  As seen in figure 13 above, corn is still 
intercropped within the grape vineyards, which was reported by villagers as being 
used for animal feed, though one might occasionally eat corn for personal 
consumption.  As described in the description of Meilishi in Chapter 1, villagers may 74 
 
 
also grow small amounts of wheat and barley within the vineyards, but this is indeed 
one of the major changes that had occurred in recent years with the introduction of 
grapes.  Wheat and barley were once the staple grain crops for Meilishi, and a major 
part of peoples’ diet, however as other cash crops including corn, and later grapes 
were introduced, villagers shifted their growing of wheat and barley towards cash 
cropping and then the purchase of rice as the staple grain for personal consumption.  
More or less, the traditional grains of Tibetan society that villagers once both grew and 
consumed have been replaced in two ways, in the fields by corn and later gapes, and 
on the household table by rice that is now purchased.  What this means for food 
security today is described in more detail in Chapter 7. 
  As also illuminated in Chapter 1, every household does indeed also grow an 
abundance of fruits, vegetables and spices for personal use.  Vegetables including 
beans, squash, peppers, tomatoes, and others are grown within the grape vineyards 
between the rows, while fruit trees tend to be scattered through the entire village, both 
in the field and around the homes.  Certainly based upon my time in the village, all of 
these foods are also a major part of the villagers’ diet, and vegetables especially will 
be integrated into daily meals along with the purchased rice.  Thus, household produce 
produced in the village is certainly an important part of both diet and food security in 
combination with outside food purchases made with money obtained though the sale 
of cash crops and other commodities.       
 
 
 75 
 
 
Breakdown of Various Natural Resource Income Sources 
 
  To conclude this chapter I provide a pie chart below to contextualize total 
annual household incomes in Meilishi, and to also show the amount of income that the 
various natural resources and agricultural products described in this chapter contribute 
to these totals.  This is useful as official government statistics often only include 
numbers from things such as agriculture and exclude sources such as chong cao 
(Winkler, personal communication).  This can be especially insightful when looking at 
vulnerability, as if the government excludes certain income sources, then the 
replacement of these may not be considered with respect to resettlement compensation. 
  As seen in Figure 14 below, chong cao and grapes make up the largest portions 
of each household’s annual mean income at 10,775 RMB (30%) and 13,195 RMB 
(37%) respectively.  All of the other sources combined (33%), would in total equal 
only slightly more than chong cao, and still equate to less than what is made from 
grapes.  This clearly demonstrates the necessity of these resources, and as previously 
mentioned, chong cao is not even an officially recognized income source by the 
government.  Current government statistics for Deqin County that report income from 
agricultural communities simply report grain and meat produced and nothing else, 
which certainly brings into question whether not only things like chong cao are ever 
considered but grapes as well, which are Meilishi’s two largest income source as seen 
in Figure 14. 
  Looking more broadly at how income in distributed among the households in 
the village versus the aggregate mean totals shown in Figure 14, median income in  76 
 
 
  
Figure 14. Mean and Percent of Total Income Sources in Meilishi
1 
1. Sample size is 20 households, and means are in Chinese RMB; 1U.S. dollar is approximately 6.3 
RMB.  
2. Only 9 of 20 households collected other forest products. 
3. Only 7 of 20 households reported income from livestock. 
4. Only 3 out of 20 households reported other sources. 
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Meilishi was 32,150 RMB taking into account all of the components shown in Figure 
14.  The lowest reported household income was 17,400 RMB, and the highest reported 
was 81,700 RMB.  The households with income that occurred at this high end of the 
spectrum indeed were those that engaged in a variety of entrepreneurial activities 
beyond standard agriculture and the collection of chong cao and other forest products.  
Two households also underreported their income, so they aren’t included as a part of 
this range.  The one household that raised a large number of yaks and dzos found it 
difficult to describe all of the income they received from selling the byproducts and 
the household that was clearly the richest in the village by observing their home and 
possessions, vastly underreported their income at only 16,600 RMB.  This was 
suggested to me by Ashu based on his experiences in similar situations, mostly likely 
due to the fact that the son in the family was closely connected to the government and 
likely didn’t want to report income because some of his dealings might be suspicious 
of even corrupt.  Without having completed a comparative study among several 
communities in the upper Lancang it is difficult to say whether or this range of income 
or median would be average within the region, however survey data from agricultural 
households in the lower Lancang (Galipeau et al. 2012), does compare well with the 
data I received in Meilishi both on the low and the high end.     
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Chapter 6: Socio-Economic Strategies and Vulnerabilities to 
Resettlement 
 
  This chapter discusses the results of the semi-structured household interviews 
and other unstructured interviews to illustrate villagers’ dependence upon resources 
such as chong cao.  In highlighting these results, the argument I make is that 
Meilishi’s economy is highly place based and reliant on villagers’ ability to take part 
in specific economic activities.  Due to the locale of the village being of such high 
importance, it is further suggested that Meilishi and perhaps other villages around it 
find themselves in a position that will make them highly vulnerable to future dam 
induced displacement.  To illustrate this result, I begin first by highlighting village 
perceptions on the importance of various natural resource and agricultural 
commodities.  I then explore results tracing the development, commodification, and 
increasing importance of these things as sources of income.  In the last section of the 
chapter, I discuss how villagers expressed the location of Meilishi being incredibly 
important in their ability to collect and grow these various things, and how this place 
based economy has made them vulnerable to resettlement.     
 
Village Perceptions on the Importance of Various Natural Resources and 
Cash Crops 
 
  As shown in Table 1 in the previous chapter, quantitatively, caterpillar fungus 
and grapes combined on average make up well over 50% of the mean household 
income in Meilishi.  This is important to note in and of itself, but just as important 
with the research being couched in local knowledge, is developing an idea of what 79 
 
 
villager perceptions were regarding the importance of these and other resources in 
their wellbeing.  Initially I asked a qualitative question about each household’s 
primary or highest source of annual income.  These responses based upon coded 
themes are outlined by frequency in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Primary Sources of Income by Household Response
1 
Chong cao 
and grapes 
Chong cao, other 
NTFPs, and grapes 
Grapes  Other  Chong cao 
12  3  2  3  1 
1. The total sample size is 20 households.  Twenty-one responses are indicated as some households 
described a mix of sources which were coded by theme separately. 
 
As can be clearly observed, by villagers’ own perceptions, grapes and chong cao are 
by far the most important sources of income.  The three “other” sources described 
included a pig factory owned by the home of the village leader, a village store selling 
local necessities, and remission from older children in one household whose sole 
residents were elderly, and who stated that they could no longer hike up the mountain 
to collect chong cao.  The additional income strategies, such as the pig factory and 
store ownership as will later be described, may indeed be very sound in the future 
compared to other less stable sources such as chong cao and grapes. 
  Following a basic question about how villagers would overall rate the 
importance of various income sources, a series of scaled questions were asked about 
chong cao, other forest products, and cash agricultures to determine how respondents 
individually rank the importance of such commodities.  In each case two questions 
were asked:  
  A. Please rate your agreement with the following statement: 
    “Chong cao is a highly important part of my livelihood.”   
    1.Disagree  2.Neutral  3.Agree 80 
 
 
   
  B. Please rate your agreement with the following statement:  
    “If I could not collect chong cao my income and livelihood would be 
    significantly lowered or depleted.” 
    1. Disagree  2. Neutral  3.Agree 
 
The same set of questions was also utilized for other forest products and cash crops, 
with chong cao simply being replaced by these terms.  Quiet interestingly, in probing 
villagers with these questions, qualitative responses regarding feelings towards the 
importance of each item discussed were also given in addition to a ranking of 
agreement.  The scaled results of these questions for all three categories are outlined in 
Table 2 below, with each labeled as chong cao A, chong cao B, other forest products 
A, etc.  As the results show, in every case, no less than 70 percent of the households 
surveyed indicated that these natural resources and agricultural crops were both an 
important part of economic livelihood, and that the loss of these resources would be 
detrimental to well being.  The chong cao questions produced the highest level of 
agreement at 100 percent and 90 percent respectively, while cash cropping came in 
second in agreement at 90 percent and 75 percent respectively. 
  As described, each of these questions tuned out to elicit various qualitative 
responses on the importance of each income source as well, which were coded based 
upon theme.  Eight households described chong cao as being a highly important 
income source, giving responses such as: 
  “It is a very important source of income.  One person can collect 15,000 
  RMB’s worth per year.  Three people could get 45,000 RMB.” 
 
  “If my family can’t chong cao fungus we will have a big problem with our 
  income and we won’t be able to buy things for the New Year.” 
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Table 2.  Scaled Responses on the Importance of Various Natural Resource 
Commodities
1 
Question A: Please rate your agreement with the following statement:   
    “Chong cao (or another resource) is a highly important part of my  
    livelihood.” 
Question B: Please rate your agreement with the following statement:  
    “If I could not collect chong cao (or another resource) my income and 
    livelihood would be significantly lowered or depleted.” 
Question  Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
Chong cao A 
 
0 (0%)  0 (0%)  20 (100%) 
Chong cao B 
 
2 (10%)  0 (0%)  18 (90%) 
Other Forest 
Products A 
 
1 (5%)  5 (25%)  14 (70%) 
Other Forest 
Products B 
 
4 (20%)  2 (10%)  14 (70%) 
Cash Crops A 
 
1 (5%)  1 (5%)  18 (90%) 
Cash Crops B  1 (5%)  4 (20%)  15 (75%) 
1. Sample size is 20 households.  
 
  “Income and health are both important because of chong cao.” 
With 8 out of the twenty households quantifying their scaled responses for chong cao 
with statements such as these, its importance was highly stressed. 
  Just as they were on average shown not to be as important quantitatively in 
Chapter 5, other forest products did not elicit nearly as many qualifying statements as 
chong cao, with only four households providing additional assessments.  Various 
ideas around these resources included assessments that if you’re not rich they can be 
as important as chong cao, but also that the prices of these things are not nearly as 
stable, making them less important.  Similarly, when asked if other resources such as 
matsutake were as important as chong cao, 10 households (50 percent) stated yes and 82 
 
 
10 (50 percent) stated no.  However, when asked if any of these things were more 
important than chong cao, the responses were 14 no (70 percent), and only 6 yes (30 
percent).  
  Nine households provided qualifying assessments of cash crops, (grapes and 
walnuts), with two primary themes, one being that grapes are more important as a 
source of income than walnuts, and the second theme being that income is better with 
grapes but that this also requires one to purchase food from outside the village, 
because less land is available for subsistence crops.  One household when asked 
whether they agreed that grapes were an important part of their livelihood also stated 
yes, but that a high reliance is based upon the outside company who arrives every year 
to purchase this crop.
19  Also, when asked if cash crops, and grapes specifically were 
considered an important source of income, 19 households (95 percent) stated yes, with 
only 1 (5 percent) stating no.  Overall, it was clear that as far as cash cropping is 
concerned, grapes are far more lucrative than walnuts.  However at one point during a 
conversation, Adong did make the assertion that having more walnuts is always better, 
and that every little bit helps.  Indeed, the village has recently planted a whole new 
walnut orchard of 100 mu
20 in total, in which each family will add to their current trees.  
Interestingly, from conversations with both Adong and his cousin the village leader, 
the seedlings for this new orchard were all provided by the government. 
  In addition to agriculture and the collection of chong cao and other forest 
products, certain households in Meilishi participate in various other economic 
                                                 
19 More details on this topic in Chapter 7. 
20 1 mu is approximately 1/6 of an acre. 83 
 
 
activities.  However, except in limited cases, these are far less integral to overall 
wellbeing.  Some households tended to me more entrepreneurial, which may indeed 
come to benefit them in the long run.  This was often due to surplus labor, or 
promotion of such activities by family members who left the village for other work or 
returned to suggest adding certain practices to their family’s economic activities.  For 
instance, the village leader owned a pig factory at the recommendation of his son who 
worked in local government.  This man owned 40 pigs, and estimated that on average 
he made 55,000 RMB
21 per year from their sales.  Similarly, Adong’s family owned 
one of two village shops from which they made 7,500 RMB per year.  These particular 
types of activities were however not the normal practice, and limited to 4 or 5 families. 
  Perhaps one of the most interesting cases was one family who chose to raise a 
large number of yaks and dzos (20) opposed to the village average of only 6.  The 
typical agropastoralist family in this part of Yunnan as described by Guo (2008), 
would traditionally have raised a large number of yaks closer to this number and 
raised grain crops mostly as animal feed.  Indeed, yaks are the staple of Tibetan 
society, so this is not surprising.  However, as other livelihood sources that provide far 
more lucrative returns have begun to appear such as chong cao and grapes, families 
have moved away from raising as many yaks and opted to grow more cash crops.  This 
seems to be especially true in villages located down in the valley bottoms like Meilishi 
that have closer access to markets and roads, as opposed to villages higher up in the 
mountains (Salick et al. 2005).  As expected, the family raising more yaks only 
                                                 
21 1 U.S. dollar us approximately 6.3 RMB. 84 
 
 
possessed about half the mu of grape fields as other households (an average of 4 mu) 
and must grow more wheat and corn to feed their yaks.  However, because most 
families have opted to raise fewer yaks, they can no longer produce enough dairy 
products to meet their daily needs (dairy is a staple of the Tibetan diet).  Thus this one 
family has been able to sell their milk, butter, and cheese to other households at rates 
that have kept them competitive in the current economy.  This has especially worked 
well because they can indeed still supplement such sales with things like chong cao. 
 
Changing Use of Natural Resource Commodities 
  Before highlighting the importance of Meilishi’s location with respect to chong 
cao and other resources, I will briefly provide a history of its commodification and the 
evolution of agricultural crops as they were described to me by villagers.  This will 
help to highlight how these things have evolved into their present level of economic 
importance.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the earliest that any villager could remember 
collecting chong cao was in the 1960’s, when they were hired by the government to do 
so.  This is not surprising as this was still within the height of China’s collective era, 
when all agricultural activity was controlled by the state through communes.  However 
in the 1980’s, with the introduction of the household responsibility system, the 
reintroduction of the smallholder system in agriculture, and the liberalization of 
markets (Netting 1993; Tilt 2008), it is not surprising that things like chong cao 
increased in their market importance as well.  The price histories of this change from 
the 1980’s up until today in Meilishi have already been described in Chapter 5, but as 85 
 
 
demonstrated, chong cao now provides the second most important income source 
within the village. 
  Similarly, agricultural commodities have changed significantly with the 
introduction of open agricultural markets.  However the current iteration of this 
change appears to be much more recent, with grapes only taking over Meilishi’s fields 
over the past eight years as highlighted in the previous chapter.  What has changed 
significantly however, is that the drive to produce a better profit as promised by the 
government with grapes, has since influenced Meilishi’s villagers to even abort the 
production of culturally important crops.  Wheat and barley much more so have 
historically had a very rich significance within Tibetan culture (Schmitt 2011), barley 
being used to make one of the Tibetan staple foods tsampa, a flour paste eaten with 
butter tea.  However today, only 8 out of 20 households indicated that they grow both 
wheat and barley, and not in any significant amounts, mostly doing so for animal feed.  
It appears agricultural preferences for profits have overall taken over both cultural and 
subsistence importance, keeping Meilishi’s economy place based, but one that relies 
heavily on outside markets
22.  Indeed as one village elder explained with respect to 
barley: “Barley used to be highly important culturally and for subsistence, but not 
anymore.”  Despite this, walnuts, which have been grown for hundreds of years, do 
still seem to play both a minor cultural role as well as a market based one. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Much more on this in the next chapter 86 
 
 
The Importance of Meilishi’s Location 
  In this chapter I have begun by demonstrating that chong cao and other forest 
products to a lesser extent, along with cash cropping of grapes and also to a lesser 
extent walnuts, are seen as highly important by Meilishi’s villagers for their wellbeing.  
I have also utilized annual income data to demonstrate these points from a quantitative 
perspective.  Bearing these facts in mind, I now seek to show the importance of 
Meilishi’s location in possessing these resources, and to then utilize this information to 
demonstrate how the village is threatened by the perturbation of resettlement. 
  Village perceptions on the importance of Meilishi being located where it is are 
very strong.  One open ended qualitative question that was asked of each household 
was to provide a description of what a good quality of life or standard of living meant 
to them.  Out of the 20 households interviewed, this produced seven prevalent themes 
which are highlighted in Table 3 below.  Of particular note are the ideas of having 
good income resources, and having higher income.  These and other themes as well, 
such as good clothing and good health all tie back to having enough money to possess 
such things.  With Meilishi’s primary income sources being agriculture and chong cao 
collection, it is not difficult to imagine that access to these things would be important 
to attain a good standard of living.  Having more money would indeed provide better 
food, including meat at every meal, and other additional comforts beyond these, as 
described by the first theme of comforts beyond wenbao, a Chinese concept describing 
basic or essential warmth and fullness.  This theme was exemplified by quotes such as 
the following: 87 
 
 
Table 3. Qualitative Themes for Good Standard of Living 
Comforts 
Beyond 
Wenbao 
Food to 
Eat/Meat 
at Every 
Meal 
Good 
Clothing 
Good 
Health 
Having 
a Nice 
House 
Having 
Good 
Income 
Resources 
Higher 
Income 
 
 
  “Children having money to buy biscuits at the store, young people being able 
  to play mahjong.” 
 
  “Having everything, the more the better.” 
 
  “A higher level to all aspects of life.” 
 
With respect to the direct importance of natural resource commodities and Meilishi’s 
locale, two highly relevant responses describing this ideal fell under the “having good 
income resources theme”: 
  “To have grapes and caterpillar fungus is a good standard of living.  Having 
  walnuts is also good even though the income from them is lower because they 
  can still help with having a good life.” 
 
  “The mountain provides a good standard because most of our income comes 
  from the mountain.” 
 
  Along these same lines, when asked to compare the standard of living in 
Meilishi with various other regions, including other villagers in the same region, and 
then areas further away such as the county town, the prefectural town, etc., a large 
range of responses and descriptions were given.  However, the most prevalent theme, 
given by 10 out of 20 households, was that Meilishi indeed had a better standard of 
living than other villages in the same area.  The primary reason for this being because 
Meilishi is located in close proximity to a mountain with many rich resources, 
including chong cao, something the villagers are proud of, as many villages in the area 88 
 
 
are not as beneficially located.  As two respondents stated when asked to compare the 
standard of living: 
  “It is also better here than other villages in Deqin.  This is the best village 
  because we have the high mountain with lots of resources and if we work hard 
  we can make lots of money from the mountains.” 
 
“It is better than other rural places and other villages around here because we 
have so many resources.  Other villages in this area must look for work outside 
the village.” 
 
This second quote brought up a major point that villagers emphasized when they 
described the rich resources of Meilishi: they are not forced to look for outside labor 
sources to fulfill their economic needs, specifically because they have chong cao, and 
to a lesser extent grapes. 
  As Adong emphasized during an informal discussion one evening, most 
villages around the Lancang in Deqin do not have access to very high pasture areas 
where chong cao can be found.  Because of this, during the collecting season, Meilishi 
indeed allows a neighboring village to share its collecting grounds but charges 100 
RMB per person per month in allowing this.  Thus, not only do villagers directly 
benefit from being able to collect the fungus themselves, they also benefit from their 
possession of a collecting space which they can use as an income source.   
  One village elder also told me that Meilishi is known for growing the best 
grapes in the whole region, or at least this is what the company that buys them has told 
the villagers.  This fact is less likely to be entirely true when one looks at other 
villages in the basin and the neighboring Jinsha River valley, where grapes are grown 
in abundance, primarily all as part of the government and Shangri-La Red Wine 89 
 
 
Company project.  Regardless of the status of the quality of its grapes, there is no 
doubt that Meilishi’s location has been highly beneficial both for its access to chong 
cao and other forest products, as well as its ability to participate in the government 
introduced grape growing program.  This fact presents itself both physically and in the 
perceptions of villagers as well. 
 
Vulnerabilities to Resettlement 
  Village perceptions and socioeconomics highlight both the importance of 
agriculture and forest products in household economic strategies, as well as Meilishi’s 
location as a major part of this significance.  What does this then mean with respect to 
the research questions of whether loss of these income sources and resettlement would 
cause economic hardship?  In the scaled questions highlighted in Table 2, a large 
majority of households indicated that a loss of access to these various commodities 
would severely impact economic wellbeing.  Based upon these facts, Meilishi’s 
economy in its current state may not be secure, and if anything is threatened merely by 
its geographic location, the same location that has provided villagers with such 
abundant resources. 
  As outlined in Chapter 2, Meilishi lies only just shortly upstream of the 
potential site for the Gushui Dam, which could become the largest dam in the entire 
Lancang cascade system, and indeed one of the tallest dams in the world (Magee 
2011).  It would flood out several communities from Meilishi to much further 
upstream in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.  In a sense, Meilishi’s proximity to 90 
 
 
chong cao and other forest products, as well as prime agricultural space for grape 
growing are mere accidents of geography, yet so is the threat of its being resettled.  If 
and when the village is resettled, it would not likely be moved to a nearby location as 
flat cultivatable land in highly scare in this region, and limited to small pockets in the 
valley bottom.  The slopes immediately above the village and within any reasonable 
distance upstream or downstream would provide nowhere near the space that is 
currently available to or needed by villagers for both their homes and farming. 
  As such, government resettlement practices further downstream in the Lancang 
Basin do not indicate that it is likely Meilishi would be relocated to a nearby location 
that would allow it to keep its access to things such as chong cao.  In these areas, 
communities have been moved to regions with much different topography than those 
that they originally inhabited and have had to make significant economic and lifestyle 
changes.  Significant alterations in cropping patterns and socio-ecological 
relationships, losses of localized ecological knowledge, and shifting away from 
agricultural income strategies to less secure forms of wage labor have all been 
observed (Galipeau et al. 2012; Tilt et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2008).  If such trends 
continue, the future of Meilishi and for that matter other villages in the area to 
continue in their current lifestyles may not be feasible.   
  Since the economic reforms of the 1980’s in China, when markets were 
liberalized and agriculture was returned to households to grow whatever crops they 
wished (after meeting government grain quotas), land has been one of the most stable 
sources of social security and income, with the withdrawal of government social 91 
 
 
services (Oi 1999; Tilt 2008).  In Meilishi’s case, land would not only refer to 
agricultural land, but forest land with chong cao and other resources as well, which is 
reduced  in resettled households in the lower Lancang Basin by an average of 11 mu 
(Galipeau et al. 2012).  If the village was relocated out of the area, there would 
potentially be a huge loss when one looks at the economic productivity of chong cao. 
  Interestingly, village perceptions and knowledge about this potential future are 
almost non-existent, and in fact many recent government programs on improving the 
village in its current location may be providing a false sense of security.  When asked 
about future economic development planned for the region and for the village, only 
one household mentioned anything about a large dam being built and resettlement of 
the village.  This respondent was from one of the richest households in the village, and 
indicated that his son was very well connected with the government thorough a road 
construction company, which is how he was aware of the future dam project.  Despite 
this occurrence, any general knowledge of the dam and resettlement was not 
widespread and most villagers seemed to be completely unaware of it. 
  To the contrary, when asked to describe various infrastructural development 
projects in the village that had taken place, and that were planned for the future, 
respondents described a large variety of projects and events that would give the 
impression there are plans to continue improving the village in its current location.  A 
range of projects were described and coded as themes, which are outlined in Tables 4 
and 5 below.  Some of the most prevalent projects that have all occurred recently 
included money between 8,000 and 10,000 RMB given out to every household for 92 
 
 
home improvements by the local township government, seedlings for a new grove of 
walnuts, a new road
23, newly paved pathways throughout the village, and future plans 
for better irrigation canals. 
Table 4. History of Development Projects 
Electricity 
20-40 
Years Ago 
New 
Concrete 
Paths 
Within 
Last Year 
New hydro-
electric plant 
(on a tributary) 
2-7 Years Ago 
New 
Road 2-3 
Years 
Ago 
Old Road 
from the 
1960’s-
70’s 
Piped 
Water 3-9 
Years Ago 
 
Table 5. Future Development Plans 
Better 
Landslide 
Prevention 
Building 
Toilets 
Continued 
Income for 
Elderly 
Irrigation 
Canals 
Sending More 
Children to 
School 
More Home 
Improvements 
Building 
Roads to Crop 
Fields 
Relocation 
for a Dam 
New Walnut 
Orchard 
 
 
  Before exploring the ramifications of resettlement as part of future economic 
development and the potential projects described in Table 5 the theme of sending more 
children to school is worth noting as it relates to the overall feelings towards education 
in the village.  Not only was this a prevalent theme among respondents with regards to 
future economic development, but many villagers including Adong often stressed the 
importance of education and ensuring that all of the village children could receive it.  
Interestingly however, due to the well off nature of Meilishi, it was never suggested 
that those of the younger generation should look for work far outside the region for the 
purposes of sensing remittances home, contrary to the general trend across much of 
                                                 
23 While this seems like a great thing to villagers for better transportation and market access, in many 
respects it may in fact simply be an indicator of improving infrastructure for future dam construction.  
One of the delays to dam construction in the Upper Lancang region as described by Magee (2011) has 
indeed been a lack of access and roads.  This new road is also part of a much larger new highway 
system connecting Yunnan with the Tibetan Autonomous Region.      93 
 
 
rural China.  Most that had received at least a partial education and were working 
outside the village were doing so locally in government or tourism in various 
capacities, and were still close to home.  The importance of education was also 
stressed by the fact that children cannot get any education in the village and have to 
travel to the county town about 1 hour or so away from primary school, and then 
further away as far as six hours for high school.  However most village households 
including Adong’s explained that they were dedicated to making this possible, with 
many indicating that children were now going to high school in the prefectural capital 
of Zhongdian or Shangri-La, with some now even attending university in the 
provincial capital of Kunming.   
  Returning to the ramifications of economic development as villagers expect it 
to occur, moving forward with projects such as those in Table 5 presents two potential 
issues: The first is that it may be creating a false sense of security among villagers 
over their current landholdings and indicating that the government plans to continue 
helping to improve local infrastructure.  Second, from the perspective of smart 
economics and sound planning, continuing to spend money on such infrastructural 
projects beyond the building of the road (which may be needed for dam construction) 
does not make sense fiscally.  Why are large amounts of money targeted for economic 
improvement being used to improve a village that officials know will be inundated in 
the near future?  From a policy perspective, such money could be much better used 
preparing the village for future settlement and to generate better economic resilience 
and recovery strategies. 94 
 
 
  In 2006, the central government of China established a law that granted certain 
rights of fairness to people displaced by dams and said that the government has to be 
absolutely certain the standards of living of displaced people are not decreased, must 
remain the same, or even be raised through subsidies and post resettlement payments 
(Brown and Xu 2010; PRC 2006).  The law, known as “Regulations on Land 
Acquisition Compensation and Resettlement of Migrants for Construction of Large 
and Medium Scale Water Conservancy and Hydropower Projects,” stated that 
communities reliant on agriculture must be moved to areas where they can continue to 
practice agriculture and must be given equal amounts of land to what they previously 
possessed.  All tress and seedlings inundated must be compensated for, and if subsidy 
and compensation payments cannot offset these losses they must be increased until 
they do.  New housing must also be provided of the same scale, standard, and function.  
Additionally, the law indicated that displaced people must be allowed to play a role in 
the decision-making process regarding their resettlement through public meetings or 
other activities (Brown and Xu 2010; PRC 2006).  Much of the literature however, 
suggests that the enforcement of this resettlement law is sporadic and uneven (Brown 
and Xu 2010; Foster-Moore 2010; Galipeau et al. 2012; Tilt et al. 2009). 
  Many questions with respect to Meilishi’s future and what its future under dam 
induced resettlement may look like are thus enacted.  Indeed, agricultural communities 
who are being resettled downstream on the Lancang since the law’s passing appear to 
receiving better subsidies from the government than communities resettled before 
2006.  However the subsidies that they are receiving are still minimal compared to 95 
 
 
other new income source that must be sought out; primarily wage labor which is not 
nearly as stable as a means of social security compared to land (Galipeau et al. 2012).  
Indeed most households surveyed during various studies in the lower Lancang 
(resettled after 2006), reported overall less agricultural income and land possessions, 
especially with respect to forest land (Chen 2008; Galipeau et al. 2012). 
  In China, having a variety of income sources, as most in Meilishi do not, is 
suggested to be an indicator of less susceptibility to vulnerability of many kinds (Jalan 
and Ravallion 2001).  Most households in Meilishi rely more strictly on agriculture of 
grapes, some walnuts, and forest products for their primary income.  Based upon such 
facts, it is not difficult to imagine that were villagers moved to a new location with 
different topography, adapting to new agricultural technologies and methods could 
prove difficult as it has in other regions of China and downstream on the Lancang 
(Chen 2008; McDonald-Wilmsen 2009; Ponseti and López-Pujol 2006; Tilt et al. 2009; 
Wilmsen et al. 2011).  However some households have indeed branched out, but this is 
limited to those families who have more educated children to make such suggestions 
or simply individuals who tend to be more entrepreneurial.  This also seems to be 
highly reliant on a larger labor force within the family, which some households do not 
possess.  Pursuing ventures such as a pig factory, a chicken factory, and various other 
business enterprises such as shops that diversify income appear as though they may 
make certain households in Meilishi more resilient to resettlement. 
  In addition to having to adapt to new agricultural practices and methods, a loss 
of forest products, and chong cao especially could be detrimental to Meilishi’s 96 
 
 
household economics.  This is the village’s second most important income source after 
grapes, and considering the fact that prices and demand for it show no slowing among 
China’s middle class, it does not appear villagers’ ability to make money from chong 
cao is going to diminish in the near future.  Chong cao has provided a way for rural 
Tibetans across the region to adapt to and form a role for themselves within China’s 
hyper capitalistic markets (Winkler 2008a and 2010a).  Take this way from Meilishi, 
and based upon average household income, it is not difficult to assess the potential 
losses.  This is further compounded by the fact that chong cao is not part of 
government calculations of annual income and census data in rural communities, 
which means that the inclusion of the loss of income that would be experienced could 
easily be left out of resettlement compensation subsidies. 
  Despite these indications, there is one area that Meilishi’s villagers appear well 
adapted to cope with the socioeconomic shocks of resettlement.  This is social 
cohesion, utilized as one of seven primary socioeconomic indicators identified and 
utilized by the Integrative Dam Assessment project (Brown et al. 2009; Tullos et al. 
2012).  During my time in Meilishi, I witnessed very strong social networks, 
especially with respect to the sharing of agricultural labor, which Tullos et al. (2012) 
identify as a very important coping mechanism for dam induced displacement in 
agricultural communities.  Indeed, many of my participant observation activities 
involved taking part in the harvest of other households’ walnuts each day.  In doing so, 
I was able to witness very strong social bonds between households as they all consider 97 
 
 
themselves to be relatives of each other
24.  One family neighboring Adong’s indeed 
relied heavily upon his and other villagers’ assistance in the harvest and other 
agricultural activities as they only had one son of twelve years old or so and a father 
who was ill with diabetes, and could not conduct any rigorous labor anymore.  This 
created a sense of angst and worry in the mother (that I could sense when I 
interviewed her), over the family’s future and ability to survive off of agriculture.  
However when it came time to harvest, several other villagers and myself and field 
assistants included were happy to provide the assistance needed. 
  During the formal household interview with Adong, he also commented on the 
social harmony of life in the village and its cooperative and familial nature.  This was 
further acknowledged by my field assistant Ashu who comes from a rural community 
in Northwest Yunnan as well, and tends to approach situations like ours in Meilishi 
like an anthropologist.  One evening as we were observing a matsutake market in the 
center of the village, and watching people interact, Ashu commented how Meilishi 
appeared to be a very harmonious and community oriented, much like his own home 
village.  By villagers’ reports, the one area where labor sharing and networks were 
however not present and when households in fact pursue income and markets entirely 
on their own was with the collection and marketing of chong cao.  As described in 
Chapter 5, each household markets their own chong cao and takes it wherever they 
wish or hope they can get the most money.  There is no labor sharing in the collection 
                                                 
24 Many may indeed be cousins as they call themselves, but I have also come to learn that in rural China 
this term may be used ubiquitously for close friends. 
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and also no sharing in the marketing of the product, which is quite contrary to most of 
the social networks that exist in the village, especially with respect to agriculture labor 
and crop marketing.    
  In closing this chapter and thinking about vulnerabilities to resettlement, I have 
several observations to summarize.  The importance of cash cropping and forest 
products, especially chong cao, has been well demonstrated both quantitatively based 
upon income figures and also by the strong perceptions of villagers towards these 
things.  This importance has also further increased over time as capitalist markets have 
developed and allowed villagers to carve out a niche form themselves as produces, 
collectors, and sellers of these things.  However commodification and marketing such 
resources has reached a point of being Meilishi’s only consistent and village wide 
source of economic output.  Because of this high reliance, villagers may now find 
themselves in a position of significant vulnerability if they are resettled, with 
consequences that have the potential to be highly damaging economically.  Despite 
this impending perturbation, there are indeed certain households who have pursued 
other income strategies that may help to make them less vulnerable and also strong 
social bonds and labor sharing networks that should help to mitigate resettlement’s 
effects.  But what else can be done or what else can occur at a community level and/or 
a government and policy one to make Meilishi and villages like it more resilient?  This 
will be discussed in the conclusion in Chapter 8, with certain recommendations for a 
more resilient future that have come to mind based upon the results of this research. 
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Chapter 7: Agricultural Market Vulnerabilities 
  This chapter discusses a level of vulnerability that I encountered during my 
time in Meilishi that I did not expect to discover in planning the research.  Many of 
my household interviews and daily interactions produced results that suggest 
Meilishi’s agricultural income from grapes, their primary income source as 
highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6, is very unstable due to various issues with the 
marketing of this crop.  This has presented itself to villagers in various ways, 
including concerns over food security and uneasiness about the ability to sell grapes 
each year due to reliance on one government sponsored factory.  What is significant 
about these issues from an applied perspective towards policy is that while 
government programs of introducing more lucrative cash agricultures have been 
successful as a rural development mechanism, continued investment in such programs 
and guaranteed security of the purchase of villagers’ grapes from year to year does not 
appear to exist. As a result, long-term economic vulnerability has developed both in 
terms of villagers’ ability to secure economic returns from their grapes, and also with 
respect to their ability to purchase and secure food for subsistence.  This indicates that 
long term vulnerability may be prevalent because there is the potential that villagers’ 
ability to make money from grapes (one of their primary sources of incomes), may be 
in jeopardy, as well as their ability to use the money made from this crop to purchase 
food. 
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The Shangri-La Red Wine Company and Government Subsidized 
Agriculture 
 
  As described in Chapter 5, while the production of grapes in the Lancang has 
existed for around 150 years by introduction of missionaries, by villagers’ accounts, it 
has only been going on in Meilishi for approximately 8 years.  Around 8 years ago, the 
government came to the village and encouraged residents to produce grapes in 
replacement of other crops, indicating and providing a certain level of verbal 
guarantee that their income would be much higher.  Over time, more and more 
households caught on after witnessing the increasing income that families were 
receiving.  By most accounts, the increased income has been welcomed, and indeed 
grapes on average now provide more income to households than any other source. 
  However during the last year, and even more specifically during my time in 
Meilishi when the grapes were to be harvested, villagers began to voice serious 
concerns about their ability to sell the grapes.  Harvesting season had arrived and the 
grapes were all ripe, but so far the company purchaser had not showed up in the 
village. Multiple times the company had contacted the village leader (his liaison) to 
indicate when and if he would be arriving, providing dates but then later canceling or 
simply not showing up in the village.  The latest I heard when I left Meilishi was that 
the purchaser was to arrive in three days, but I am not aware whether or not this 
actually occurred.  During my time in Meilishi, many villagers expressed their concern 
that they were losing money daily as the longer they had to wait to harvest the grapes, 
the more the fruit would dry out and decrease both in quality and also in weight, which 
is how they are sold. 101 
 
 
  Villagers have been given the impression by the government and the wine 
company that their grapes are important and that maybe in Meilishi they even produce 
some of the best grapes available.  As one household elder stated: “Grapes in this 
village are the best in the whole region, people bring cars and come here for our 
grapes.”  However this is not likely considering the sheer volume in which grapes are 
grown throughout the dry river valleys of the region.  In fact, the unimportance of 
Meilishi’s grapes to the overall business of the government and its wine project may 
indeed be the issue at hand.     
  There are many explanations for what may be occurring here, and the best 
research into this situation would have involved being able to speak with prefectural 
government officials who are involved in the Shangri-La Red Wine project, as well as 
members of the wine company to assess it full business nature.  However my level of 
visa approval and sponsorship for my research in Meilishi would have made such an 
undertaking politically risky.  Still, there is much previous research and material that 
may help to illuminate what is occurring to cause villagers angst and create instability 
in their grape marketing.  The Shangri-La Red Wine Company is most likely a private 
company with close ties to the prefectural government or even a private company that 
is highly subsidized for its role in promoting the idea of “Shangri-La.”  A culling of 
various Chinese internet sources seems to suggest that the Shangri-La Red Wine 
Company is indeed a type of joint venture between the prefectural government in 
Zhongdian, and investors in Hong Kong. 102 
 
 
  Much of the tourism development in Diqing Prefecture has followed this 
model, with privatized economic development occurring at the direct hand of the 
government, or what Oi (1995 and 1992) calls “local state corporatism.”  Similar 
phenomena have also been described in agricultural systems and state interplay with 
farming communities as well (Li and Tilt 2007; Tilt 2008).  As Li and Tilt (2007) 
explain, while in general the state has retreated from direct agricultural governance 
and decision making in China (leaving this to individual farmers), local governments 
still exert much influence over agriculture and its markets, especially when they play a 
role in local economic development.    
  The above referenced study by Li and Tilt also took place in Yunnan, in an 
area highly populated by minority groups like Diqing Prefecture, where Meilishi is 
located (2007).  In this case, the local government became involved in sugar 
production as a rural economic development strategy, much like what has occurred 
with the production of wine in Diqing.  Similarly, villages were targeted for their 
ability to grow sugar, and the government began to create economic incentives to 
encourage certain villages to become “sugar villages,” in the same way that Meilishi 
and other villages around it have come to grow solely grapes.  This was successful to 
some extent; however various financial issues forced the government to privatize the 
publically owned sugar mill.  This was done via a system of insiders, which gave the 
mill more financial stability but kept the sugar production highly connected to the 
local government, which has remained highly involved in sugar production and 
pricing as a means of revenue (Li and Tilt 2007). 103 
 
 
  The parallels between the sugar research of Li and Tilt (ibid) and the case of 
grapes in Meilishi are quite striking.  Whether there may be financial issues with 
regards to the wine factory in Diqing are unknown, but the demand for grapes (or any 
other crops like the case of sugar), are highly based on market fluctuations and the 
ability of one government subsidized or owned company to be able to sell and market 
enough product to continue to need crops from village farmers.  As Li and Tilt suggest, 
this means a high level of vulnerability for farmers, especially in the western regions 
of China where economic opportunities for rural people are limited.  As the authors 
state about the case of sugar villages in their study:  
  “This designation of specialized sugar cane villages has created whole classes 
  of farmers whose economic viability depends on a single cash crop with a 
  highly uncertain future.” (ibid). 
 
This is quite similar to the case in Meilishi, where grapes are the highest source of 
household income and the loss of which, especially for homes not engaged in other 
economic activities beyond grape production and chong cao collection would certainly 
mean economic hardship.  Indeed, in some cases in the study by Li and Tilt (ibid), 
some farmers in designated sugar villages returned to growing other cash crops for 
which they made less money, but at least more than they could make at times when the 
government did not live up to its obligations for sugar. 
  In Meilishi, two households did indicate to me that if the price of grapes were 
to drop, or villagers were unable to sell them they could return to growing more corn 
as a cash crop.  In this case however, the economic returns would not be near the level 
that villagers have come to expect from grapes over the past several years, and 104 
 
 
economic wellbeing, especially for those who do not have as many diversified income 
sources could be expected to drop.  As one respondent explained with respect to 
looking for outside labor work: “By planting grapes I can stay in the village, and 
decide my own life.”  Similarly, villagers have come to expect a certain standard of 
living that grapes have brought them as an economic development tool.  Under the 
theme of having good income resources as a standard of living previously outlined in 
Table 4, two households had the following to say: 
  “To have grapes and caterpillar fungus is a good standard of living.” 
  “We have professional knowledge about growing grapes, that is a good 
  standard.” 
 
Though only described by two households, the introduction of grape growing by the 
government was also described as a significant event of economic development in the 
village.  
  As Li and Tilt (2007) describe, government promotion of certain cash 
agricultures has brought about a certain level of economic wellbeing and expectations 
to Meilishi’s villagers.  However, the future of this wellbeing is highly uncertain and 
indicates a level of vulnerability if Meilishi continues to expect that grapes will 
provide a certain level of income.  In many ways, this is not unlike Muldavin’s (1996) 
political ecology critique of agricultural reform and governance in China, in which he 
argues that state corporatism and use of smallholder agriculture for economic 
development has led to the market exploitation of rural agricultural labor and 
resources.  Certainly in the case of Meilishi, such a critique is possible, and 105 
 
 
improvements could be made towards a more holistic use of the smallholder system.  
Such suggestions will be given in the next chapter. 
 
Ramifications for Food Security 
 
  A second issue of vulnerability experienced in growing grapes for cash 
markets that was raised by Meilishi’s villagers was that of food security.  As described 
in Chapter 5 prior to transforming their fields to grape vineyards, villagers grew much 
larger quantities of grain (primarily corn, barley, and wheat) than what they grow 
today.  This meant that households were also far more self-sufficient in terms of 
feeding themselves.  Yet today, with the introduction of grapes and more land being 
devoted to them, this is no longer the case.  According to some households, grapes 
indeed also require them to purchase more crop inputs such as fertilizers and 
pesticides than they previously had to use with other crops.  Continued use of such 
inputs also then raises questions about the continued viability and long-term 
sustainability of the land as production is intensified with chemicals (Tilt 2008).  
These various issues are described in the two following quotes from household 
interviews: 
  “Before we planted grapes we didn’t have to buy corn and pesticides, but now 
  we do.  However our income is still better growing grapes.” 
 
  “If you plant grapes your income will increase, but you also have to spend 
  more money to buy food.” 
 
  With the introduction of grapes, what has clearly occurred in Meilishi is the 
development of a more market oriented society with better income, but also less self 
sufficiency.  This is further compounded by the fact that the ability to purchase 106 
 
 
necessary grain and other food staples is completely dependent on whether or not 
villagers can market and sell their grapes.  Something that is already problematic as 
described in the previous section, with respect to the reliance on the one company to 
do so.  These issues are not isolated in China, as more and more smallholder farmers 
and households transition to what appear to be more lucrative cash crops over grain 
stapes (Tilt 2008). 
  As Tilt (ibid) outlines, within China’s reformed agricultural system of 
smallholders, created after the decollectivization of agriculture in the 1980’s under the 
Household Responsibility System, households now tend to adapt and change their 
agricultural practices based on market conditions.  One major reason for this is that 
with the withdrawal of many government subsidized social services, more income is 
needed, which can be provided by agricultural land and the commodity crops that it 
may provide.  Similarly, when market conditions appear to be unstable, cropping can 
be diversified to ensure income stability (Tilt 2008; Veeck and Li 1996), however this 
is not the case in Meilishi where under government encouragement villagers have 
basically developed a mono-cropping system.  This means that like some households 
in Tilt’s (2008) study, families in Meilishi are almost entirely dependent on 
agricultural markets for both economic stability and subsistence.  However in 
Meilishi’s case, there is no crop diversification and villagers have to assume that they 
can make money from grapes, otherwise they cannot purchase enough food to sustain 
themselves.   107 
 
 
  Basically, a paradigm shift in economic development has taken place. Farmers 
choose to grow cash crops because this will help ensure a better standard of living 
over growing grain for both subsistence and marketing, due to the fact that grain prices 
are not nearly as high, though stable and controlled by the government.  However the 
returns from grain, while more stable, are not nearly as lucrative and do not help to 
elevate one’s economic wellbeing.  Based upon these trends, Tilt (ibid) points out that 
in studies in other regions in the world, ensuring the long term economic (and 
subsistence) success of smallholders has involved a closer relationship between 
governments and farmers in regulating and controlling markets to ensure their stability.  
In Meilishi’s case, such a suggestion would certainly seem prudent.  Families are 
growing only one supposedly (according the government) cash crop are now feeling 
great worry both toward their reliance on one government sponsored buyer for this 
crop and their continued reliance on buying more grain and other food from outside 
sources. 
  The issues surrounding commodified agriculture are not unique to Meilishi or 
to China.  In an in depth ethnographic account of coffee farmers in Oaxaca, Mexico, 
Jaffee (2007) describes very similar trends.  Framers have chosen to grow coffee 
because they can make more money, however this also means that they are dependent 
on local marketers, known as coyotes to purchase the coffee.  Similar to Meilishi, a 
feedback loop has developed where more coffee is grown to make more money, 
decreasing land for the primary subsistence crop milpa, and causing a certain level of 
angst and concern among the growers.  They worry about how they will be able to 108 
 
 
purchase enough food to survive and support themselves when they depend entirely 
upon the coyotes.   
  If anything, Jaffee’s study when compared against the case of grape growing in 
Meilishi shows that globally, there are serious flaws in the ways that governments and 
developed regions utilize and consume the crops of rural and developing farmers and 
regions.  This is not to say that to encourage these communities to grow grapes or 
coffee is a negative way to help them develop.  As demonstrated in both this and 
previous chapters, villagers expressed to me time and time again that growing grapes 
has made their lives significantly better.  However the ways in which they can 
securely procure a better living from this crop are a matter of serious concern.  In 
Tilt’s observation on other regional studies of commodity crops as an economic 
development tool, he points out that from a political ecology perspective, such 
methods have worked, but only when central governments and local farmers develop 
more holistic and mutually supportive relationships (Bassett 2001; Grossman 1998; 
Tilt 2008).  Indeed, this appears to be the biggest missing element in the case of 
Meilishi, where villagers also asked me as an outsider who they assumed has some 
level of official influence, if I could help them work with the government to get better 
prices and market security for the grapes on an annual basis.  My own thoughts on, 
and recommendations regarding this situation are provided in the next chapter.              
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
  In this thesis I have examined how the villagers of Meilishi currently find 
themselves in a situation of socio-economic vulnerability as is threatened both by 
resettlement for a large hydropower project, and by various agricultural market 
structures.  To understand these things, my approach has been to utilize the 
perceptions and opinions of local villagers about their various economic activities and 
their importance.  Both in terms of valuing local opinions and ideas as important for 
resilience in natural resources and agricultural governance, and also from the idea of 
political ecology that social and political systems are an important aspect of the 
vulnerabilities that are occurring in Meilishi. 
  With respect to resettlement and the villages’ economic strategies, I have 
shown how households are highly reliant on a specific set of natural resources and 
agricultural commodities, including grapes and chong cao.  The collection and 
production of which are highly reliant on Meilishi’s present location.  Additionally, 
there also seems to be both an apparent lack of knowledge among villagers that their 
village may be planned for relocation, as well as a false sense of security created by 
government investments meant to develop village economics and infrastructure in its 
present location.  The question I have then posed and will address in this conclusion is: 
What does this mean for the future of the village and in what ways can resilience to 
this future perturbation be fostered? 
  In terms of vulnerabilities exhibited through agricultural markets and 
governance methods, Meilishi’s villagers have expressed a serious angst towards their 110 
 
 
high reliance and trust in the prefectural government and its sponsored Shangri-La 
Red Wine Company to purchase their grapes.  Several problems have arisen because 
of this.  Villagers are inclined to continue investing in and growing grapes because 
they have seen the high economic return that this crop can provide and how it has 
elevated household livelihoods.  However an ever present concern is whether or not 
the grapes can be sold from year to year, which causes some to consider returning to 
the production of corn that would have much lower economic returns.  The growing of 
grapes has also led to an increased use of pesticides and other inputs, possibly 
affecting long term viability of farm land and soils.  Furthermore, there is also a worry 
and issue of food security, as households have converted to commodity grapes in 
exchange for subsistence grains, forcing them to purchase these from outside sources. 
The ability of which to do so depends entire on their ability to sell the grapes. 
 
Reflections on Future Hydrodevelopment 
 
  What will actually happen in Meilishi and the surrounding area with respect to 
hydrodevelopment is still uncertain.  Dams have been proposed, and initial planning 
has been initiated, but beyond this there is much that is still unknown about these 
projects versus those further downstream on the Lancang (Magee 2011).  As Magee 
(ibid) and Magee and McDonald (2006) suggest, development of dams on the lower 
Lancang is more or less a fate acompli, but this is not clear in the upper sections where 
Meilishi is located.  Various developments in the past year may also come into play as 
well. 111 
 
 
  Due to the fact that the upper Lancang and Meilishi lie in the internationally 
designated Three Parallel Rivers UNESCO World Heritage site (UNESCO 2006), 
(though areas at river elevation are left out of this designation assuming the desire to 
build dams), a certain amount of scrutiny has occurred towards rapid construction of 
dams.  Most recently, in July 2011, the UN committee in charge of oversight for world 
heritage sites expressed its continued concern over the development of dams and 
mines in areas adjacent to the Three Parallel Rivers World Heritage Site.  In 
expressing this concern, a deadline of February 1, 2012 was set for China’s 
government to submit environmental impacts assessments for all proposed projects 
adjacent to the site, to better assure that they will not negatively harm the cultural and 
biological diversity within the boundaries of the site.  Specifically, UNESCO was 
concerned about the fact that dam construction is occurring in areas where it has not 
received full approval by China’s central government (UNESCO 2011).   
  Additionally, in early 2012, China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection 
released a new report enhancing previously established standards for the construction 
of dams.  In this report, three minimum standards were given that it is said must not be 
violated: (1) No hydropower projects may be established in protected areas, (2) the 
projects must not interfere with people’s right to a healthy living environment, and (3), 
projects should not interfere with the ability of a watershed ecosystem to thrive (Brody 
2012).  Some analysts might see these pronouncements more pessimistically, but in 
my mind these are reasons to think positively towards to future of Meilishi and the 
upper Lancang under a regime of dam induced resettlement.   112 
 
 
  The resettlement law that was passed in 2006 and is described in chapters 3 
and 6 is also a reason for optimism.  Admittedly, most of the literature on dam induced 
displacement in China focuses on the Three Gorges Region, where over 1 million 
people were re-located.  However at the time this resettlement occurred, the 2006 law 
did not yet exist, and in most cases there was no place for public participation from 
local communities as the law now calls for.  Additionally, issues and pictures of 
communities living destitute lives have also been described downstream on the 
Lancang at the first dam constructed in 1996, Manwan.  Here we have come to hear 
about villagers searching through garbage piles simply to locate enough food to eat 
(Mertha 2008).  Admittedly as well however, in the case of Three Gorges, China’s 
government has since acknowledged that there have been many inexcusable social and 
environmental costs associated with the project despite its benefits (PRC 2011).  If 
anything, despite the rapid pace at which hydropower is being pursued in China as a 
means of renewable energy in replacement of coal, a certain amount of stepping back 
and introspection towards how this pursuit is being done appears to be occurring. 
  I myself am not an opponent or proponent of hydropower so to speak, but as 
someone studying its potential social effects from an applied perspective, I think it is 
worth weighing the costs of such projects to attempt to find the most equitable 
outcome and benefits for as many parties as possible.  Indeed, even the highly critical 
World Commission on Dam recognized the value that dams have had as tools of social 
and economic development (World Commission on Dams 2000).  As three 
participants at a recent forum for experts and interested parties on hydropower 113 
 
 
development in China hosted by the Integrated Dam Assessment project noted in 
various ways: 
  “Right now we are trying to develop a dialogue in China between power 
  companies and NGOs, prior to a few years ago, there was none.” 
  “For a long time everyone told China you are wrong.  Ok, so we will build 
  dams.   No that’s bad.  We’ll subsidize renewables.  No that’s bad.  To provide 
  advice  rather than criticism, developing trust will be far more successful.” 
  “The idea of integrative basin management is lacking because there is no 
  international standard to equalize benefits.  There will always be losers and 
  winners.  However there should be a way to do hydropower development right, 
  and if we do it right, it can be a very good thing.” (Anonymous participants) 
  In a broader context, what each of the above quotes exemplifies is that there 
really is no simple answer as to whether building dams in China (or anywhere else) is 
a good method of development or a negative one, but rather that the way in which this 
is done must be examined from a deeply critical perspective.  This has been the heart 
of political ecology as I see it in this thesis.  To examine socioeconomics and 
development practices in Meilishi through a critical lens, to better understand what is 
at stake under various environmental management and development scenarios in the 
future. 
  As I have indicated earlier in this section, such recognition has begun to occur 
on an official level in China as well (PRC 2011), and while the steps that have been 
taken in more equitable representation of all parties involved may be small, they do 
now exist (Brody 2012; PRC 2011; PRC 2006).  Similarly, the activity and ability of 
localized grassroots movements and civil society have a begun to play a role in 
hydropower and other natural resource decisions in China as well (Buesgen 2008; 114 
 
 
Mertha 2008; Yan 2012); beginning to remove the one major barrier to resilience or 
level of vulnerability in China’s river basins as described by McNally et al. (2009).  
As the authors (ibid) point out, China’s political structure has actually made river 
basins highly resilient to hydrodevelopment on most levels (national and provincial), 
yet lacks such resilience and demonstrates vulnerability on the local level due to low 
public participation from local communities.  If this is indeed changing as some 
indications seems to show, then there may be more time for better planning to address 
the social impacts of resettlement (and agricultural commodification) both in Meilishi 
and in similar communities worldwide.   
  The sense of place and local conservation ethic around the sacred mountain of 
Khawa Karpo at whose base Meilishi sits, and which provides the village with its rich 
resources, was recently threatened by mining development close by to another village 
on the Nu River side of the mountain (Yan 2012).  Without being consulted about this, 
local villagers reacted, and with persistence were eventually able to convince the 
government to heed their opinions, ending the operation of the mine, which as the 
villagers saw it was indefinitely harming their local environment and resources (ibid).  
If this is any indication, it indeed appears that with persistence, local participation is 
possible in managing and developing the rivers and resources surrounding Meilishi in 
Northwest Yunnan, and perhaps elsewhere in similar situations.  Keeping this in mind, 
as well as the idea described by McNally et al. (2009) that where the Lancang River 
may be vulnerable to hydrodevelopment is at a local community level, I now move on 115 
 
 
to provide my specific recommendations for what actions might be taken to generate 
better resilience in Meilishi. 
 
Recommendations for a Resilient Future 
 
  Arguably, the primary missing component in Meilishi’s capacity to adapt to 
resettlement which makes it vulnerable is a lack of knowledge among villagers of this 
potential perturbation.  As I have shown both quantitatively and qualitatively, Meilishi 
is highly reliant on its present location for villagers to live relatively well, and by what 
they themselves deem to be a good standard of living.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that resettlement of the village and loss of chong cao access and 
collection, along with the production of grapes would have to be detrimental, just that 
better enhancement of adaptive capacity among villagers is needed.   
  The first necessity would be to ensure that villagers play an active role in the 
process; something that the 2006 resettlement law stipulates is required.  As the law 
states, villagers must be adequately informed of government plans and be allowed to 
play an active role through public participation and meetings (Brown and Xu 2010; 
PRC 2006).  So far this has only happened in resettlement projects to a very limited 
degree, and those who have been resettled have expressed that they did not feel 
adequately recognized or acknowledged in the public planning process (Brown and Xu 
2010).  However, has I have described in this chapter, the institutional capacity of civil 
society in China with respect to environmental development projects indeed seems to 
be increasing, even in communities in Meilishi’s region.  This is a positive sign. 116 
 
 
  Under the law of resettlement, villagers’ ability to experience a productive 
agricultural livelihood must also not be affected and compensation must be 
continuously provided for crops and trees lost until income reaches the same level that 
villagers currently experience.  If it is not possible for the same agricultural 
livelihoods to be maintained, villagers must be given adequate vocational training so 
that they can maintain their socioeconomic status, and government subsidies must be 
provided continuously if this is not possible (Brown and Xu 2010; PRC 2006).  This is 
an area of concern, as adequate subsidy provisions do not appear to have occurred in 
other resettlement projects downstream on the Lancang, or often rather the money for 
which these subsidies is intended is left in the hands of local governments to use at 
their own discretion (Zhang et al. 2008). 
  Perhaps the greatest concern that must be addressed with respect to Meilishi’s 
resettlement is the potential loss of access to chong cao.  While the resettlement law 
states that agricultural communities must not lose any source of livelihood, or have 
this maintained through compensation subsidies, it is not difficult to expect that this 
also refers only to officially reported income sources.  As described in Chapter 5, 
Chong cao is not an official source of income in government calculations, so it could 
very easily be left out of resettlement compensation programs.  With chong cao being 
one Meilishi’s two primary income sources, and a highly lucrative one, this is an issue 
that must be adequately addressed.  My specific recommendation in this respect is that 
villagers were very good at articulating the importance of chong cao to me as highly 
important for their wellbeing.  So knowing this, if they were given free voice and the 117 
 
 
capacity to play an active role in their resettlement, this fact could be adequately 
addressed.  If policies are followed correctly, the loss of grapes in this case may not be 
as detrimental as chong cao however, as these are recognized as an official source of 
income by the local government who also relies on them (to a limited extent) for 
Shangri-La Red Wine. 
  With respect to the concerns over this industry, and the high reliance on the 
government and the wine company to purchase the grapes each year, I have two 
recommendations.  The first would be to provide assistance to the village in finding 
other outlets to market their grapes.  This is the best immediate solution, because 
every household has already invested large amounts of time and money in this crop, so 
starting over with something else would make things more difficult in the short term.  
I am familiar with one Swiss development NGO working in the region that has indeed 
expressed an interest in working with villagers to provide training and equipment for 
wine making, so that they may sell some wine directly to tourists themselves.  This has 
been fairly successful as an income strategy downstream in the Tibetan Catholic 
village of Cizhong, where missionaries originally introduced the growing of grapes 
and wine making.  If anything, projects such as this, if it can be undertaken, would 
diversify outlets and uses for grapes, alleviating some of the vulnerability of relying 
solely on the one government sponsored factory each year to purchase them. 
  The other longer term strategy would be to work with villagers to diversify 
their cash crops.  One possibility would be to work towards more integrated growing 
of both grapes for the higher income that they provide, along with growing higher 118 
 
 
amounts of corn, which as villagers told me would at least be more stable as an 
income source.  Similarly, one could also conduct research on agricultural markets 
within the surrounding region to explore other cash crops that might provide the 
village with diversified income sources.  Adapting cash crops to markets and 
diversifying their production has been well documented as a positive income strategy 
in rural China (Schmitt 2011; Tilt 2008), but one that Meilishi has not explored as 
much.  Meilishi has been locked into grapes by the lucrative but deceiving promise of 
the higher income that they provide. 
 
Broader Implications and Closing Thoughts 
 
  In thinking about the research questions for my study several things have been 
made clear and enlightened upon.  Villagers in Meilishi are indeed highly reliant on 
the money produced from chong cao, grapes, and other resources to live a quality life, 
and would certainly appear to be vulnerable to economic hardship without these 
income sources.  Second, the village’s location is a highly prevalent issue; not only 
making it vulnerable to resettlement due to a potential lack of access to various natural 
resources, but also because by their own description, Meilishi’s villagers in fact see 
themselves as living in one of the richest and most abundant villages in the area in 
terms of the income bearing natural resources that are available.   
  So what does this say about the broader global implications of Meilishi’s 
vulnerability as a case study, and the theoretical framework that I have built upon?  In 
general most of the vulnerability research and theory, especially that in the political 
ecology realm, has called for more equitable representation and understanding of local 119 
 
 
and often ignored and marginalized populations.  As Forsyth explains when describing 
political ecology, a more anthropocentric account of environmental vulnerability 
specifically looks at the social and political factors that reduce people’s access to 
resources, and also unlike earlier environmental anthropological approaches, couches 
research within a global context instead of in a localize vacuum (2003).  However in 
general, most political ecologists tend to say yes, local, especially third world 
communities are vulnerable, but often make this more of a generalization without 
explicitly highlighting where such vulnerability exists and why specifically (though 
some do).  Similarly, vulnerability literature on hydrodevelopment says that in 
authoritarian situations such as China’s, there is more vulnerability and less resilience 
on a local level (McNally et al. 2009).  However once again, where is this 
vulnerability with respect to local natural resources exactly, how does it present itself, 
and in what way can it be alleviated?  A gap exists here, which I intended to fill with 
this thesis research.  Many have studied and analyzed local and “traditional” 
knowledge about natural resources, processes, and their management, but it seems few 
have translated these studies into specific definitions and analyses of where potential 
vulnerabilities to large scale development might exist.  
  This is where this study contributes, primarily from a methodological 
standpoint.  If China’s government or any government for that matter were to ask a 
local community about their income and livelihoods and in what ways they utilize 
local natural resources to live and make an income, they might be very surprised by 
the results.  Chong cao for instance is something highly desired by the Chinese and 120 
 
 
consumed by them at ridiculously high prices, however it is doubtful that any 
government planner involved in hydrodevelopment and resettlement would have any 
idea that one of Meilishi’s villagers’ primary income sources is actually chong cao.  
Due to the fact that this is not part of the household economic scheme that the village 
households are classified by.  More generally, it is precisely this type of research that 
can help governments and other organizations find ways to better mitigate 
vulnerability to large economic development programs.  By using the approach of this 
study, no pre-suppositions about the livelihoods of local villagers were made, and in 
fact the issues and concerns surrounding grapes came as a quite a surprise to me as a 
researcher.             
    With respect to overall quality of life, all but one household in Meilishi told me 
that their standard of living was better today than five years ago (the one household 
who said it wasn’t indicated it was the same).  With this being true, and with most 
average members of Chinese society indicating their life is better today than in 
previous decades, the one and only detriment to this success as I see it would be to 
force villages like Meilishi in China or elsewhere into a lower standard of living than 
what they have come to experience today.  When the quality of life in even rural China 
has reached arguably unprecedented levels, what becomes disheartening is to see these 
same rural communities lose this success at the expense of further developing the 
nation as a whole.  We have seen the negative social effects of dams and resettlement 
multiple times in China, but it does not mean that we have to continue to do so.  As 
long as the building of a dam or even the development of a local wine factory to 121 
 
 
promote tourism, can holistically take into account the opinions and values of local 
communities, such projects can be used as an effective means of development for the 
betterment of a society as a whole.  In many ways, as described by McNally et al. 
(2009), the Lancang is an incredibly resilient socio-ecological system within China, 
except at the local level where institutional capacity is lacking.  Thus it is my hope that 
in this thesis I have helped to bring this local voice to the table.  To conclude, I would 
like to draw on the words of Cosens (2010) to further express what it means to govern 
a socio-ecological river basin like the Lancang in an adaptive manner for better 
resilience, both within society and in the ecosystem itself: 
  “Adaptive governance moves from a focus on efficiency and lack of overlap 
  among jurisdictional authorities, to a focus on diversity, redundancy, and 
  multiple levels of management that include a role for local knowledge and 
  local action…polycentric governance would mean granting a larger voice and 
  decision making power locally while retaining a network of state and federal 
  government.  Again, this redundancy in government, viewed as inefficient in 
  the past, enhances the resilience of government to adapt to change.”                 
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